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Abstract 
 
 Many people have already questioned whether Greece would default: investors, 
economists, politicians and general public. The Greek debt crisis has also caused a great 
turmoil in the EU causing fears of its spreading to other countries with poor fiscal 
situation in Eurozone through bond markets. Finally the rescue package was prepared 
for Greece consisting of EUR 110 billion loan facility from both Eurozone and IMF. 
 We study the Greek fiscal crisis in the thesis. We try to find its real causes in the 
historical chapter and we also show the methodology which can be used to assess the 
credit risk of Greek government using bond market information and CDS contracts 
information. In the empirical part we study the evolution of the probability of default of 
Greek government during the debt crisis using parsimonious model based on the bond 
market information. 
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Abstrakt 
 
 Mnoho lidí si již položilo otázku, zda Řecko zbankrotuje: investoři, ekonomové, 
politici i veřejnost. Řecká dluhová krize také způsobila velký rozruch v EU, působící 
strach z jejího rozšíření do ostatních zemí Eurozóny se špatnou fiskální situací skrze 
trhy s dluhopisy. Nakonec byl pro Řecko připraven záchranný balíček, který je tvořen 
110 miliardami EUR v podobě dluhové facility od Eurozóny a Mezinárodního 
měnového fondu. 
 V práci studujeme řeckou fiskální krizi. V historické kapitole se snažíme nalézt 
její skutečné příčiny a též ukazujeme metodologii, která může být použita k ohodnocení 
kreditního rizika řecké vlády pomocí informací z trhu s dluhopisy a pomocí informací 
z kontraktů swapů úvěrového selhání. V empirické části studujeme vývoj 
pravděpodobnosti bankrotu řecké vlády během dluhové krize pomocí parsimonního 
modelu založeného na informacích z trhu s dluhopisy. 
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increased several times. Greek government bond markets reacted to the worsening of Greek’s fiscal situation 
because of rising riskiness of Greek government bonds connected to the higher risk of their default. During the 
April 2010 Greek government bonds started to decline in value more dramatically causing their yields to rise 
significantly. But the rising yields meant higher costs of financing government debt for Greek government which 
caused government troubles with liquidity or even solvency. Because Greece is the member of Eurozone a big 
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Introduction 
 
 Recent world economic crisis has pronounced problems with debts of several 
countries with loose fiscal policies in the European Union, such as Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal, or Spain. The first country, where the crisis augmented to critical extent was 
Greece. The ability of Greek government to manage the crisis without sovereign default 
was doubted and the external aid in the form of unprecedented financial support in the 
form of loan facility from other Eurozone countries was provided in the hope of 
stopping the crisis from spreading to other Eurozone member states. In the thesis we 
study the Greek government debt crisis, its causes and also its evolution. As the main 
goal we try to estimate the evolution of the probability of default of the Greek 
government during the crisis using the information from the sovereign bond market.  
 The first chapter can also be called as a historical part of the thesis. We focus 
mainly on describing the both economic and political evolution of the crisis in recent 
years, from 2009 to April 2011, when the thesis was finished. But we also try to go into 
more distant history and we find the roots of the crisis in 1970s, so we show that the 
crisis was not caused by the accession of Greece to the EEC or to the Eurozone, but that 
it had much deeper and more country-specific causes. The last part of the first chapter 
studies the specific problems of Greek economy, which are shadow economy, tax 
evasion and high unemployment rate. 
 In the second chapter we introduce the methodology of using bond market 
information for evaluation of probability of default of Greek government. We show the 
main advantages of the bond-based models for the case of Greek debt crisis. Then we 
study the theory of probability of default. Finally we describe the theoretical 
background behind the chosen method of using bond market information for estimation 
of probability of default, which is the parsimonious method based on estimation of 
instantaneous forward credit spread curve of Greek government bonds using Nelson-
Siegel based approach of estimating zero coupon bond yield curves from coupon bond 
data. 
 In the third chapter we show the alternative approach to the estimation of credit 
risk of government using the credit default swap contract information. At first we 
describe the CDS as an instrument. Then we show how to calculate the fair value of the 
CDS premium, which leads us to the estimation of the recovery value, which is used as 
a mean of credit risk valuation. 
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 In the fourth chapter we apply the methodology shown in the second chapter in 
the case study of Greek government default risk. We estimate the daily evolution of the 
hazard function of the Greek government during the period of last two years and then 
we test the evolution of hazard rate through this period using several time series 
methods, including tests for structural breaks. Then we summarize our findings and we 
also discuss the drawbacks of the chosen method which were detected when it was used 
in practice. 
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Literature review 
 
 We will introduce the literature which was used in the thesis here. We will focus 
on the contribution of chosen literature to this thesis. 
 The historical part of the thesis is based on several works studying the 
economic history of Greece or its economy itself, on official EU documents and also on 
news from reliable online newspaper publishers, such as Guardian and Reuters. The 
news showed to be a very convenient and good source of information as they provided 
up-to-date information about so very quickly evolving topic as the Greek fiscal crisis is. 
 Alogoskoufis (1995) was an important source of Greek modern economic 
history. He studies the evolution of Greek institutional framework along with the 
economic performance. He pinpoints the most important events in Greek modern 
history from the political point of view also. He also deeply analyses evolution of main 
macroeconomic indicators of Greece from 1957 to 1992 and shows that there was a 
change in nature of Greek economy in 1974 and shows why. 
 Matsaganis and Flevotomou (January 2010) study the tax evasion in Greece and 
find that tax evasion is an important problem in Greece which causes redistribution of 
income. They found that the richest people in Greece do evade taxes most, so the tax 
progressivity is reduced and, in addition, when Greek government collects fewer taxes 
due to tax evasion, taxes have to be higher than without evasion. They also provide us 
with valuable estimates of tax evasion by level of income. 
 McGee and Tyler (October 2006) show an interesting study on tax evasion from 
the ethical point of view, which is relatively scarce in literature. The study presents the 
attitude of taxpayers in 33 countries, Greece among them, on the ethics of tax evasion. 
From the study we were able to see that Greece is ranked as a country where the tax 
evasion is not rejected much. 
 Schneider and Enste (1999) aim at estimation of sizes of shadow economies of 
76 countries all over the world, including Greece, and show us also the methodology of 
the estimation. They also discuss the shadow economy, its definition and how it affects 
the economy. 
 Schneider (September 2010) focuses more at the recent world economic crisis 
and its impact on the size of shadow economies of Germany, Greece and other 19 
OECD countries. He finds that Greece has the biggest share of shadow economy of all 
OECD countries. 
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 The most helpful for the theoretical part of the thesis was Andritzky (2006). He 
study sovereign defaults in various countries and then he focuses on the estimation of 
probability of default of governments. He uses bond market information for that 
estimation and provides us with much theoretical concepts which can be used for it. 
After application of several presented methods in empirical studies of several countries, 
he also shows an alternative method for estimation of probability of default, which is 
exploiting information from CDS contracts. 
 Byström and Kwon (2005) study the bond market and provide us with a market-
based approach to the estimation of their probability of default. They use this method 
for estimation of creditworthiness of firms. They see several advantages of the market-
based approaches over the traditional credit rating methods. At first, we can estimate the 
entire “term structure” of default probabilities. We also do not rely on any historical 
values, possibly bad or outdated, we use only current market information. It is also not 
vulnerable to any data manipulation, feature required for the case of Greece. 
 Nelson and Siegel (1987) is a famous work on construction of parsimonious 
model of the yield curve. They try to find a model which would be simple and flexible 
enough at the same time. They succeeded in finding a model which fitted US Treasury 
bill yield curves well, allowing three basic shapes: monotonic, humped and S – shaped. 
We will use this model in the empirical part of the thesis. 
 Ferstl and Hayden (2010) provided us with a very practical paper which presents 
us the usage of the package called termstrc in software R for estimation of zero coupon 
bond yield curves using both coupon and zero-coupon bonds data. The paper not only 
shows the practical implementation of the package, but also reviews the needed 
theoretical background.  
 Baltagi (2008) is an econometrical textbook covering many areas of 
econometrics. It is the very useful resource of various econometrical methods needed 
for the testing of hypotheses in this thesis, mainly for the methodology of the Chow‟s 
test for regression stability. 
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1. Greek fiscal crisis of 2010 
 
In the end of 2009 and especially in the beginning of 2010 media started to 
discuss worrying debt situation of Greece. Problems with Greek fiscal policy did not 
appear without causes and not so suddenly as it could have seemed. Even though the 
interest of media and public in worsening fiscal situation of Greece rose dramatically as 
late as from the beginning of 2010, the conditions for crisis developed continuously 
during many years before and the 2010 crisis is just the tip of the iceberg. We will 
discuss why the crisis appeared from a broader perspective. We will also see what is so 
worrying about situation in Greece, so we will be able to better understand why there 
have appeared doubts about solvency of Greece and thus why investors saw higher risk 
of default of Greek government. We will at first show the chronological evolvement of 
the Greek fiscal crisis from its origins in 1970s, then we will focus much more carefully 
on the latest development of the situation and then we will focus on tracking the reasons 
why the crisis happened recently from a broader perspective. 
 
1.1. The foundations of the crisis 
 
 The history of the crisis of 2010 goes back as far as to 1970s, a way back before 
Greece entered the EEC and Eurozone. We will thus see that it is irrelevant to claim that 
the entry of Greece to EEC or Eurozone itself caused the crisis as it is from time to time 
claimed by some people. As the primary source for economic history of Greece in this 
period we will use Alogoskoufis (1995). In 1974, after a period of seven years of 
military dictatorship, a democratic regime was restored. Until then the role of state in 
the economy was not very important, except for public administration, banking, 
electricity and telecommunication sectors. The economic regime of dictatorship was 
almost the same as in 1950s and 1960s and Greece saw a period of prosperity backed by 
low business taxes, high investments, protection of property rights etc., which created a 
good environment for growth. However, in 1973, after the collapse of Breton Woods 
system and the rise in commodity prices, heavy inflationary shock hit Greece. Greece 
was his so severely because of the carried repressed inflationary pressures from 1969 
onward when the economy almost reached its full capacity, but administrative controls 
11 
did not allow wages and prices to accommodate. The severe crisis in 1973 led to the 
political crisis of the dictatorship and to its fall in 1974. 
 After 1974 deep changes in economy started to happen under the Konstantinos 
Karamanlis, founder of the New Democracy party. There was a dollar peg regime 
before which was abandoned for a crawling peg regime. The monetary policy became 
very lax, together with the fiscal policy. Some populist steps were taken, such as 
increased redistribution, also the defense expenditures were expanded quickly. Even 
though the labor unions had just little power before, they became very powerful now. 
Together with extensive price controls the real wages were increased steeply, but 
accompanied with increased government expenditures and increased business taxes, 
which were low before. The property rights were endangered and the role of the state in 
the economy was increased by much nationalization, such as nationalization of the 
second largest banking group. In 1981 Greece entered the EEC and this year also saw 
PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) win the parliamentary elections and Andreas 
Papandreou became the prime minister of Greece. 
 The role of state was strengthened even more with more nationalizations and 
income redistribution, together with widened price controls and wage indexation. The 
government debt started to boom and Greece also had to face a balance of payments 
crises in 1985 and 1989/1990. In 1990 Konstantinos Mitsotakis of New Democracy 
became the prime minister and in 1992, the third Minister on National Economy, 
Stephanos Manos, tried for the first time to take an action to fight the deficit. Measures 
to liberalize prices, to deregulate state enterprises, to reform social security system, to 
run privatization of state enterprises and to increase infrastructure investment were 
taken. However, in 1993, after new elections, PASOK won the elections and Andreas 
Papandreou became the Prime Minister. Fiscal reforms were reversed or abandoned and 
no further steps were taken to fight the deficit. 
 We can now study several graphs depicting the evolution of Greek economy 
from 1980 until 2010. Following graphs show the evolution of government deficit 
during this period together with the total government debt. 
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Figure 1: Greek government net lending/borrowing (% of GDP) 
 
Source: IMF Data Mapper. Accessed 18 April 2011 
 
Figure 2: Greek government gross debt (% of GDP) 
 
Source: IMF Data Mapper. Accessed 18 April 2011 
 
 We can see that even though in the beginning of 1980s the total volume of the 
debt was still relatively low, it quickly ballooned to values breaching 100 % of GDP. 
We can see that the debt was being built until 1993, and then it became conserved at 
levels around 100 % of GDP.  
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1.2. History of the crisis of 2010 
 
 We will now show how the crisis of 2010 itself evolved chronologically as it 
will be an important part for establishing hypotheses for empirical part of the thesis. We 
will mainly focus on the relation between Greece and the European institutions in the 
first part as in that time there was not much attention paid to the Greek situation, but 
from certain point we have much information from news. We will use the most reliable 
for our purpose to see the crisis not only from the perspective of the Greece – EU 
official relations. 
 
1.2.1. The Greek excessive deficit procedure 
 
 Even though the Greek fiscal crisis broke out in 2010 to the full extend, we 
should go back to the 2009 if we want to follow it from its beginning. We will follow 
mainly the EDP of Greece which we will see will be very helpful if we want to find the 
trigger point of the crisis itself. 
 On 18 February 2009 the European Commission made a report (Commission 
Report 2009/197/SEC) showing a bad state of Greek deficit and its total debt. It is a 
report prepared for The Council in cases that there is a suspicion that a country of the 
EU should enter so called EDP. According to the legislation which was in force, there 
were two conditions for a country to enter the regime of EDP: 
“(a) whether the ratio of the planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic 
product exceeds a reference value, unless: 
- either the ratio has declined substantially and continuously and reached a level that 
comes close to the reference value, 
- or, alternatively, the excess over the reference value is only exceptional and temporary 
and the ratio remains close to the reference value; 
(b) whether the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product exceeds a reference 
value, unless the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at 
a satisfactory pace.” (OJ C 325, 24/12/2002, Article 104) 
The Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force 31 December 2009, adopted 
legislation concerning EDP from TEC with only changes concerning procedure itself, 
not the conditions which decide whether EDP should be started for a country (OJ C 306, 
14 
17/12/2007, Article 126). Therefore we know that the rule of entering EDP didn‟t 
change. The two reference values which the rule refers to are 3 % for the government 
deficit and 60 % for the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product and did not 
change by the Treaty of Lisbon (OJ C 321 E, 29/12/2006, Protocol No 20 and OJ C 115, 
09/05/2008, Protocol No 12). 
The report from the Commission mentioned before (Commission Report 
2009/197/SEC) concluded that both criteria were breached, because government deficit 
reached 3.5 % in 2007 and debt to GDP ratio stood at 94.8 %. Report stated that deficit 
cannot be seen as temporary nor exceptional, because “fiscal imbalances have been high 
and persistent for many years, in spite of the buoyant economic activity up to 2008, and 
have structural roots” (Commission Report 2009/197/SEC, p. 2). It also stated that “the 
debt ratio cannot be considered as diminishing sufficiently and approaching the 
reference value at a satisfactory pace” (Commission Report 2009/197/SEC, p. 11). 
Next step in the procedure was done on 24 March 2009 when three documents 
were created by the Commission. At first, Commission published its opinion on Greek 
deficit based on its previous report from February. It came to the result that “the 
Commission, having taken into account its report and the opinion of the Economic and 
Financial Committee, is of the opinion that an excessive deficit exists in Greece.” 
(Commission Opinion 2009/563/SEC, p. 6) The second step was that the Commission 
recommended the Council of the European Union (further just Council) to adopt a 
decision which would agree that there is an excessive deficit in Greece (Commission 
Recommendation 2009/564/SEC). The last document was a recommendation of the 
Commission to the Council which would recommend Greece to end the excessive 
deficit situation (Commission Recommendation 2009/565/SEC). 
As the Commission recommended the Council decided that an “excessive deficit 
exists in Greece” (OJ L 135, 30/05/2009, p. 22) on 27 April 2009 and it also 
recommended Greece to end excessive government deficit situation on the same day 
(Council Recommendation 2009/7900/09/CR). 
On 11 November 2009 the crucial document was released by the Commission 
(Commission Recommendation 2009/1549/SEC). It can be considered the trigger point 
of the crisis. In the empirical part of the thesis the hypothesis whether 11 November the 
crisis started will be tested. This Commission recommendation for a Council decision 
“establishing whether effective action has been taken by Greece in response to the 
Council recommendation of 27 April 2009” included several important facts about 
15 
evolution of Greek situation relevant for fiscal sustainability of Greek economy. At first 
this decision concluded that “Greece has not taken effective action in response to the 
Council Recommendation of 27 April 2009 within the period laid down in that 
Recommendation” (Commission Recommendation 2009/1549/SEC, p. 13). It means 
that Greece did not try hard enough to end its excessive deficit, which was a bad signal. 
But the key information mentioned in the document relevant for beginning of the crisis 
was that Greek data concerning the deficit had to be revised substantially. The table no. 
1 shows the evolution of the Greek deficit estimates until 11 November 2009 as they 
were published in various documents. 
 
Table 1: The evolution of estimates of Greek government deficit and GDP growth 
until 11/11/2009 (in % of GDP and in % respectively) 
 GDP growth Government deficit 
 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 
Budget 2009 3.2 2.7 N/A 2.5 2.0 : 
Commission 2009 January 2.9 0.2 0.7 3.4 3.7 4.2 
Stability Program 2009 January 3.0 1.1 1.6 3.7 3.7 3.2 
EDP notification 2009 April : : : 5.0 3.7 : 
Commission 2009 Spring 2.9 -0.9 0.1 5.0 5.1 5.7 
EDP notification 2009 October : : : 7.7 12.5 : 
Commission 2009 Autumn 2.0 -1.1 -0.3 7.7 12.7 12.2 
Source: Commission Recommendation 2009/1549/SEC 
 
 We can clearly see that all estimates were worsening over time. But the most 
important change was the estimate of 2009 deficit by EDP notification from 21 October 
2009 (Eurostat, 21/10/2009). The deficit was revised to be more than twice the estimate 
from previous, Commission, estimate and it was now by 10.5 pp higher than was the 
Greek 2009 budget plan. In addition to this revision, Commission Recommendation 
from 11 November 2009 also increased the estimate of 2010 government deficit 
substantially to 12.2 % and newly concluded the poor effort done by the government to 
cope with the budget which together was important information for public which started 
to worry about bad fiscal situation in Greece from this moment on. This decision was 
later really adopted by the Council on 19 January 2010 (OJ L 125, 21/05/2010). 
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1.2.2. Worsening of the situation and introduction of reforms 
 
From this moment on the situation of Greece was rapidly deteriorating and it 
was more and more sure that it will become unbearable and Greece will have to ask for 
external aid. However many actions were taken to try to avoid the worst. The interest of 
public and media in Greece started to grow. Rating agencies, responsible, among others, 
for estimation of credit risk of governments started to worry about the Greek 
government‟s creditworthiness. The Fitch rating agency downgraded Greek rating from 
A- to BBB+ on 8 December 2009 with negative medium term outlook (Smith and 
Seager, 8 December 2009).  
The Greek politicians tried to calm down the situation, namely George 
Papandreou, newly elected Prime Minister of Hellenic Republic after Greek elections on 
6 October 2009 (Smith, 6 October 2009) promised to run an intensive overhaul of Greek 
economy to improve its public debt in a speech given on 14 December 2009 (Smith, 14 
December 2009). In his speech he proclaimed that his program would reduce fiscal 
deficit to 3 % by the 2013 when his election period ends. His plans were to cut off 
expenditures by lowering government operating expenditures, consumption costs and 
by contracting the big public sector. 
The Greek stability and growth program was presented by Greek finance 
ministry on 14 January 2010 (Reuters, 14 January 2010). Its main goal was to reduce 
large budget deficit. The growth of Greek economy was to be driven by development of 
areas where the Greece had comparative advantage. Deficit was projected to decline 
gradually and the debt would peak, according to the predictions, in 2011 at 120.6 % and 
would slowly shrink thereafter at pace of several percentage points per year. 
Expenditures were to decline from 52 % of GDP in 2009 to 47.7 % of GDP in 2013 and 
revenues were expected to increase from 39.3 % of GDP in 2009 to 45.7 % in 2013. 
These goals were backed by many intended reforms and changes in fiscal strategy 
addressing many flaws of Greek economy. Government committed to restoration of 
trust in government statistical services by ensuring more independence of National 
Statistics Service. The important step was also to reform tax system in order to simplify 
it and also to improve its vulnerability to tax evasion by auditing enhancement. Great 
attention was paid to expenditure reforms which were to reduce government spending. 
A contingency reserve was to be created from 10 % of budgetary appropriations to 
create a budgetary pillow for 2010. In addition salaries exceeding EUR 2000 monthly in 
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the public sector were intended to be cut by 10 % and frozen during 2010 and no 
employees were to be hired to replace retired public sector employees in 2010 and the 
replacement was to be done in 5:1 ration from 2011. Also operating expenditures of 
ministries were to be cut by 10 % in 2010. Also some long run plans were shown 
among those the most notable were reforms of health care expenditures and pension 
system. 
The EU, however, addressed Greek government officially to improve Greek 
budget deficit, so the Council posted a decision with steps which should be done in 
Greece to end the excessive deficit procedure to Hellenic Republic on 16 February 2010 
(OJ L 83/13, 30/03/2010). The deadline of the year 2012 was given to end the excessive 
deficit. The Council stressed that there were specific steps to be done in order to run 
fiscal consolidation in line with the Greek stability and growth program mainly. The 
measures are divided into three types: A. measures to be taken by 15 May 2010, B. 
supporting measures and finally C. measures to be taken by the end of 2010. The 
measures are divided further to expenditure, revenue and fiscal framework types. There 
are also strict deadlines for reporting on progress of reforms. The proposed steps are in 
many features similar to Greek stability and growth plan. 
The expenditure side steps to be taken by 15 May 2010 were to move 10 % 
budgetary appropriations of government‟s departments intended to be used in 2010 for 
use when the good use of them would be rationalized later, then the wages were to be 
frozen, recruitment stopped (even replacement of retired permanent officials) and 
vacancies canceled in government sector in 2010. Also the cuts in special allowances 
paid to civil servants were to be cut. The document also proposes cuts in transfers by the 
social security not specifying any precise numbers. The short term revenue side actions 
include implementation of progressive tax scale for all types of income and also not 
differing between labor and capital income. To try to fight against tax evasion, the 
presumptive taxation was to be introduced for self-employed. Also all tax exemptions 
were to be cancelled in the tax system. Also other tax-gains-increasing measures were to 
be introduced, as increase in tobacco, alcohol and fuel excise duties and also an 
introduction of permanent levies on buildings and overall increase in real estate tax 
rates. 
Next part lists measures to be adopted by the end of 2010. On the expenditure 
side of budgetary measures there is the rule of 5:1 retired public sector employees 
replacement rate introduced as it was by the Greek stability and growth program. Also 
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the pension and healthcare system reforms are to be done to bring lowered expenditures, 
for example using increasing the retirement age, lower upper limit of pensions. Finally 
the wage bill is to be lowered by reform of the wage payment system. The revenue 
measures to be taken by the end of 2010 are the increased endeavor in the fight against 
tax evasion and fraud, which are two very burning issues in Greece as it will be shown 
in the chapter 1.2., by amelioration of legal enforcement of tax payments. The material 
also stress that all potential gains are to be used for deficit reduction. Also the tax 
collection administration is to be enhanced by establishing of tax collection department. 
There is also part devoted to the fiscal framework enhancement pinpointing some 
additional measures to be taken in order to improve the fiscal position of Greece, such 
as the fight against corruption in public administration, setting spending ceilings, 
avoiding reduction in average maturity of public debt (obviously due to fears that 
increasing interest rates would cause low-maturity debts to renew at higher rates more 
quickly than long-maturity debts, thus increasing the deficit), etc. 
There are also fiscal measures to be adopted by 2012. On the expenditure side, 
need for permanent savings by lowering government consumption is stressed by further 
reduction of wage bill and social transfers accompanied by lower number of public 
employees. On the revenue side, just a continued effort in the reform of tax 
administration is mentioned. The Greece should also further improve its fiscal 
framework and, which is very important, try to improve its general government data 
collection mechanisms. 
 
1.2.3. The need for an aid package 
 
Meanwhile the debates across the EU started about the possible aid which could 
be provided to Greece. On 28 January 2010 George Papandreou said Greece would 
solve its problems on its own and that he did not ask about any bilateral loans with 
Germany or France (Elliott, 28 January 2010). It was, however, very bold claim, 
because the possibilities of raising debt regularly through the market dramatically 
worsened as the interest rates were climbing quickly. The closing yield till maturity of 
10-year Greek government bond was 7.059259 % on 28 January 2010 (Reuters Wealth 
Manager). The increasing interest rates on government bonds, which were the primary 
element of government debt, increased also the cost of governmental borrowing, so 
Greece stood, with its great deficits and rising costs of borrowing, on the edge of 
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vicious circle. Borrowing at higher rates lead to increased expenditures and to the need 
of bigger loans to cover larger deficit, thus decreasing its creditworthiness and 
increasing interest rates further. In analyses made later they realized that Greece needed 
to raise new debts worth approximately EUR 53 billion just to service its debt until the 
end of the year (Smith, 4 March 2010). We can also demonstrate the severity of the 
situation looking at the evolution of spread of Greek 10 year bonds over German 10 
year bonds during and also before the crisis to compare it. 10 year maturities are 
commonly used for reference. You can also see a comparison of a short-term 3 year 
bond yield and spread in the following picture to see that the yield curve exercised a 
reversed shape typical in crisis. The spreads of 3 year bonds rose to values near 2,000 
basis points in the worst period of the crisis, which is a very rare value for government 
bonds. 
 
Figure 3: Greek 3 and 10 year government bond spread over German government 
bonds (in basis points) 
 
Source: Reuter‟s Wealth Manager. Accessed 14 April 2011 
 
In the beginning of 2010 there was no interest of Greek government in any 
support from EU as Papandreou said on 28 January 2010 (Elliott, 28 January 2010). 
Greek government wanted to try to solve the situation domestically. Some negotiations 
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were done about the possible aid from the EU (Traynor, 9 February 2010), but 
especially Germany did not want to do such a bailout. Angela Merkel, Chancellor of 
Germany, said that Greece did not ask for any support and “repeatedly emphasised that 
Athens would need to put its own house in order and brushed aside all questions of 
financial support” (Traynor, 11 February 2010). 
The situation evolved very quickly as already during the March 2010 the 
negotiations were renewed and Germany did agree with other 15 Eurozone members 
and IMF on the very first version of rescue package for Greece on 25 March 2010 
(Traynor, 26 March 2010). It was negotiated that a package will be ready if Greece will 
need it as a possibility of last resort. Some concrete terms, however, were not negotiated 
yet. Angela Merkel also conditioned the help by introduction of new stricter rules for 
countries which will endanger Euro currency by its bad fiscal discipline. It is an 
important note to say that the Greek fiscal crisis caused serious problems for the whole 
Eurozone as the future of the whole Euro currency was challenged in opinion of many 
(see chapter 1.3. for further discussion of this issue). 
On 11 April 2010 the conditions of Greek rescue package got a concrete form 
(Wray, 11 April 2010). It should have a form of EUR 30 billion debt pegged at 5 % 
interest rate, which was main advantage of the package for Greece, because the closing 
yield of 10 year Greek government bonds was 7.195153 % on Friday 9 April 2010 
(Reuters Wealth Manager). The important legal feature was that "if the mechanism had 
to be activated, it would not be a violation of the no-bailout clause (in the European 
Union treaty) since the loans are repayable and contain no element of subsidy," said 
Jean-Claude Juncker, the Luxembourgian prime minister and the president of 
Eurogroup (Wray, 11 April 2010). The whole amount of EUR 30 billion was to be 
provided by all Eurozone members proportional to their share in ECB‟s capital. IMF 
was to provide additional loan of approximately EUR 15 billion. Papandreou still did 
not ask for the package to be activated and he still hoped in the ability of Greece to 
borrow through the market. 
Nevertheless, four days later Greek economics minister has officially asked IMF 
and EU to discuss the specific conditions of aid package. “‟Markets have no patience – 
when they cut you off, they cut you off. It's a matter of trust between the borrower and 
the lender, and Greece has done things wrongly in the past,‟ an official close to the 
Greek government said.” (Moya, 15 April 2010) By this moment, markets became 
really impatient in upcoming days and more and more seeing the possible default of 
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Greece as an existing threat. On 15 April 2010 the closing yield of Greek government 
bonds was 7.182477 % (Reuters Wealth Manager). Several days later, on 23 April 2010, 
Greece activated the financial aid package from IMF and EU as the austerity measures 
did not avert the fear of bankruptcy and the cost of borrowing through the market 
steadily rose (Smith, 23 April 2010). The 10 year government bonds stood at new peaks 
closing at 8,823047 % on 22 April 2010 (Reuters Wealth Manager), day before the 
activation of the aid, so the EUR 16 billion of debt maturing in May, were quickly 
becoming too expensive to refinance. 
The German part of the help was, however, froze until Greece would enact 
stricter austerity measures from the IMF, which were longer and more radical than those 
from the EU. German part of the package amounted EUR 8.4 billion (Traynor, 26 April 
2010). Market yields of Greek government bonds continued to rise quickly in the light 
of these events together with the news that Standard & Poor‟s rating agency 
downgraded Greek government bonds to the first non-investment, so called “junk” 
status on 27 April 2010 (Wachman and Fletcher, 27 April 2010). Day after the non-
investment grade was assigned to Greek government bonds, the yields of 10 year bonds 
peaked at the day high of 12.588 % (Reuters Wealth Manager). One of the main reasons 
for a downgrade may have been that the rescue package was not, by many experts, large 
enough. Erik Nielsen of Goldman Sachs said that it should have been at least EUR 150 
billion over next 3 years and Steven Major, head of fixed income research at HSBC, 
said it should have been at least EUR 110 billion over next 2 years (Wachman and 
Fletcher, 27 April 2010). 
 
1.2.4. Expansions of the aid package in the light of worries about 
debt contagion 
 
 While the first aid package seemed to be insufficient, which was proved by the 
steep increase of yields on Greek government bonds showing the fear of investors, the 
package was quickly expanded. There were new terms of the aid package negotiated on 
2 May 2010 (Traynor, 2 May 2010). The package now consisted of EUR 110 billion 
distributed into 3 year period. The Eurozone members contributed EUR 80 billion and 
IMF contributed EUR 30 billion to the package. It was also conditioned on quarterly 
monitoring of progress of implementation of Greek austerity measures. The 
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international aid in this amount had never been realized before. ‘“This programme is 
unprecedented … in the scale of the financial support," Olli Rehn, European 
commissioner for monetary affairs, said last night.‟ (Traynor, 2 May 2010) However it 
seemed there were no other choices if the Greece should be saved and the Euro currency 
as well. “José Manuel Barroso, head of the European commission, described the bailout 
as decisive in preserving „the stability of the euro area‟.” (Traynor, 2 May 2010). 
 The markets, however, did not react to this news positively and the Greek 
government bond yields continued to rise. Many started to claim that even this bigger 
aid will not be sufficient for Greek recovery (Wearden, 4 May 2010). According to 
Elliott (4 May 2010), for example, the aid for Greece had features which made the 
situation even worse. He says that if Greece was not a part of Eurozone, IMF would 
suggest Greece to help its export by devaluation of currency and reduce interest rates to 
offset the fiscal tightening of austerity measures. However he says that it cannot be 
done, because Greece is in the monetary union and cannot control its monetary policy. 
He then worried about the future of Greece, because the inability to support growth via 
exports, combined with drastic austerity measures damaging the aggregate demand, 
would lead to the “economic death spiral”.  
 As also in other countries debt crises had developed, such as in Spain, Portugal 
or Ireland, crisis of Eurozone and the whole European Union arose. There were fears 
about the future of the Euro currency mainly. Wachman and Allen (9 May 2010) 
provided a helpful overview of opinions of several experts on the crisis of Eurozone. 
We will mention them briefly. Richard Lambert, Director-General of the Confederation 
of British Industry, said Euro currency was “more a political project than economic 
one” and thought that its end would be “potentially disastrous” for member states, 
because it would also mean increased political and economic uncertainty. Gerard Lyons, 
Chief economist at Standard Chartered, believed that Euro was not sustainable in its 
current form. He said that history showed that without a political union there had never 
survived any monetary union of large nations. He said that the one interest rate did not 
suit all countries and thus that Eurozone was not optimal currency area. Anton Börner, 
President of BGA, the Federation of German Wholesale and Foreign Trade, wanted 
Euro to survive this crisis much. He defended Euro as very beneficial for all Eurozone 
member states, especially for their export-dependent companies. He said that no need 
for currency hedging and exchange fees saved much money for them saving jobs as 
well. He also mentioned that no volatility of exchange rates in Eurozone also made 
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long-term planning easier. John Fitzgerald, Economist at Economic Social Research 
Institute, Dublin, did not foresee a collapse of Eurozone. He admitted that the Greek 
rescue package “raised expectations that other countries with problems can rely on 
outside help”. However he believed that other countries in crises, such as Spain, would 
be able to solve their problems. Lord Jay of Ewelme, Vice-chair of Business for New 
Europe, said that the “crisis was not caused by the markets – it was caused by 
governments spending beyond their means. They have been in denial about rising debt 
and the need for economic reform.” He believed that after the crisis the Euro would help 
countries to grow. Dylan Grice, Global markets strategist at Société Générale, was not 
sure whether the Euro would have collapsed, but he warned all indebted governments to 
pay attention to the market which could behave unexpectedly. 
 The fear of contagion of the debt crisis through several other Eurozone countries 
with debt difficulties and effort to stabilize markets led to the decision to establish an 
unprecedentedly large package for debt crisis stricken countries on 10 May 2010 
(Elliott, 10 May 2010). The total amount of aid was EUR 750 billion, of which EUR 60 
billion were intended to be loans for countries with imminent debt problems, other EUR 
440 billion were in the form of loan guarantees from the EU and another EUR 250 
billion from the IMF. 
 The fears about Eurozone future lead to take further steps in Germany, which 
banned short selling of stocks of 10 biggest German financial institutions, but also of 
sovereign bonds of Eurozone members and CDS on them. The ban was to be in effect 
until 31 March 2011 and it only covered trading via BaFin, financial regulatory 
authority of Germany (Wearden, 19 May 2010). It was a step to try to fight against 
speculative trades with named instruments.  
 
1.2.5. Further development 
 
 Further development of the situation until recently can be described briefly as a 
very turbulent period. The fear of contagion was extended to Hungary on 4 July 2010 as 
it was revealed that Hungarian former government falsified data on Hungarian 
government debt, according to Hungarian prime minister‟s spokesman, and Euro 
currency reacted to this news by a drop in value to a four-year minimum (Reuters, 4 
June 2010). The whole turmoil in the EU about the debt crisis in Greece and also in 
several other countries together with speculations about the unsure future of the Euro 
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currency harmed value of Euro as we can see in the graph below. Euro was on a 
downtrend approximately from November 2009 to June 2010. 
 
Figure 4: USD/EUR exchange rate (in USD per 1 EUR) 
 
Source: Reuters Wealth Manager. Accessed 10 March 2011 
 
 While the Greek government tried to fight against its debt, painful fiscal 
restrictions had already caused many demonstrations and strikes in Greece. The tensions 
escalated during the summer holidays of 2010, when Greek truck drivers were on strike 
for six days. The strike had paralyzed whole economy as there were shortages of petrol 
supply, for example. Petrol had to be distributed using military vehicles to ensure it at 
least for airports, hospitals and power stations (Smith, 1 August 2010). A guerrilla 
group Sect of Revolutionaries exploited the situation and said via declaration: “We 
intend to turn it (Greece) into a war zone of revolutionary activity with arson, sabotage, 
violent demonstrations, bombings and assassinations, and not a country that is a 
destination for holidays and pleasure.” (Smith, 3 August 2010) 
 Meanwhile, however, several positive events also happened from perspective of 
the Greek government. The statement of a monitoring visit of Greece by the EU, IMF 
and ECB concluded that the Greek government made a strong progress and 
implemented reforms even ahead of schedule, which was followed by allowance of 
drawing another funds, EUR 9 billion, from the aid package (Moya, 5 August 2010). 
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However the statement also concluded that it is important to improve efforts in tax 
collection. It was reflected in the speech by George Papandreou on 20 October 2010 
who pronounced that “there will be no additional burden placed on wage earners and 
pensioners” (Smith, 20 October 2010) and instead he wanted to fight against tax 
evasion. Over 1 million tax evaders were offered an amnesty for 10 years back. Yannis 
Kapeleris, the head of the financial crimes unit, said his goal was to collect penalties 
EUR 5 billion in 2010 (Smith, 20 October 2010). 
 Later, in December 2010 Eurostat estimated that the public debt will continue to 
grow rapidly in Greece reaching 160 % of GDP in 2013 and the prediction of 
unemployment rate for 2011 was also worrisome 15 % accompanied by the estimate 
that 2 million Greeks lived below poverty line and more than 25 thousand businesses 
had been closed since May 2010 (Smith, 6 December 2010). 
 During the crisis also several controversial suggestions were presented by the 
creditors of Greek government to fight against its debt also by privatization of various 
national properties, such as many tourist attractions, beaches, ports, airports etc. 
International auditors proposed privatizations worth approximately EUR 50 billion. 
Papandreou said, however, that such privatizations would not be considered (Smith, 17 
February 2011). Approximately one month later Papandreou succeeded in negotiation 
of better terms of repaying the aid package. The interest rate was reduced by 1 p.p. and 
the repayment period was also prolonged to seven and half years, almost doubling the 
original length of the loan. However, speculations that better terms were allowed thanks 
to the agreement to the controversial EUR 50 billion privatization program arose 
(Smith, 13 March 2011). 
 By the time this thesis was finished the Greek government had not defaulted, but 
the speculations were rising about the restructuring of Greek debt being inevitable 
solution. Greek families, for example, would welcome it because of the painful fiscal 
restrictions which would not be necessary in the whole extend if the debt was 
restructured. There are estimates saying that the disposable income of an average family 
was reduced due to austerity measures by 40 % (Smith, 13 April 2011). However, 
restructuring would also harm Greek creditors, such as banks or pension funds and 
would destroy Greek‟s creditworthiness much making it impossible to borrow from 
capital markets again for a long time, so George Papandreou insist the reforms are the 
right solution and rejects any speculations on Greek default (Smith, 13 April 2011). We 
will probably see in the near future if the reforms will stabilize the situation in Greece 
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which is not sure at all nowadays. As far as the Greek aid package is concerned, we can 
conclude this chapter by the table of disbursements done by the EU and IMF so far to 
Greece as European Commission reports them. 
 
Table 2: Disbursements of funds of Greek Loan Facility (in EUR billion) 
Disbursements Euro-area IMF Total 
May 2010 14.5 5.5 20.0 
Sept 2010 6.5 2.5 9.0 
Dec 2010 -- 2.5 2.5 
Jan 2011 6.5 -- 6.5 
March 2011 10.9 -- 10.9 
Source: European Commission (2011) 
 
1.3. Origins of the crisis of 2010 
  
 We will now study why the fiscal crisis broke out in Greece. We will try to 
tackle its real causes. There are several fields of interests we will have to search for our 
goal. We cannot cover all causes because of the complexity of the problem, but we can 
try to find the most important.  
 
1.3.1. Role of the world financial crisis: just the last straw 
 
What is very important is to remind that Greece, as most countries in the world, 
also struggle due to the global financial crisis. Someone could suggest that it is the main 
reason why the fiscal crisis arose in Greece. But even though there are many economies 
stricken with the crisis and many have some fiscal problems, in no other country of the 
EU neither total debt in percent of GDP nor government deficit in percent of GDP is as 
huge as in the case of Greece (see appendices 1 and 2). Also we saw in chapter 1.1. and 
we will see in chapter 1.3.3. that there are long-term causes of the fiscal crisis. The 
world financial crisis just pronounced those problems to extreme. 
In appendix 1 and 2 you can see the comparison of evolution of government 
deficits and total debt amounts, all in percent of GDP, for all current EU countries. As 
we can see, most EU countries extended their debts and most EU countries also 
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worsened their deficit during the world financial crisis (from 2007). Even though there 
are some countries with also worrying state of their public finance in the EU, situation 
of other countries of the EU is not as urgent as the crisis in Greece is despite of the 
world financial crisis. It means that the world financial crisis is not the only cause of the 
fiscal crisis in Greece. We will argue in other sections of this chapter that there are 
many other causes which were specific to the Greek economy. After realizing this, the 
world financial crisis can be seen more like something that unveiled the weaknesses of 
economy rather than something what caused the fiscal crisis itself. 
We will now try to demonstrate the first simple insight into the idea that the 
fiscal crisis in Greece had structural roots and that the world financial crisis would not 
cause the fiscal crisis without these structural causes. 
 
Figure 5: Government deficit (-)/surplus (+) in Greece and EU 27 (in % of GDP) 
 
Source: Eurostat Statistics Database. Accessed 23 November 2010 
 
If we inspect the figure above we can see an important finding: Greece has run 
its budget with substantially higher deficit than the average of EU 27 is for many years. 
Secondly, Greece has never met requirement of deficit under 3 % during the period 
under consideration, even after adoption of Euro in 2001. In contrast, this rule was 
breached by “average EU 27 country” importantly only during the world financial 
crisis. 
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Figure 6: Total government debt (in % of GDP)  
 
Source: Eurostat Statistics Database. Accessed 23 November 2010 
 
The figure 6 shows that Greece never complied with 60 % debt to GDP ratio 
requirement during the selected period. What is even more important is that there is not 
even a downward trend in the ratio, but it just oscillated around 100 %, value to which 
the debt was built in 1980s as we saw in chapter 1.1., before the crisis and then it soared 
to 126.8 % in 2009. The average of EU 27 oscillated around the requirement value and 
went up during the crisis.  
 
Figure 7: Growth of the real GDP in Greece and EU 27 (in %) 
 
Source: Eurostat Statistics Database. Accessed 23 November 2010 
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 From the figure 7 we can see that Greece had substantially higher real GDP 
growth than the average of EU 27 during the selected period, especially before the 
world financial crisis. The average growth of real GDP of Greece between 2000 and 
2007 is 4.2 %, while in EU 27 only 2.4 % (author‟s calculation based on appendix 3). It 
is important to mention that GDP growth values from 2004 until 2009 are still 
considered provisional by Eurostat. All other countries of EU 27 have all values 
considered as final in the selected period. Nevertheless even data from 2000 till 2003, 
which are considered final, show the presented evidence. You can also see the detailed 
table of all EU 27 countries‟ GDP growth values from 2000 till 2009 in appendix 3.  
 If we merge our findings about Greek real GDP growth and government deficit 
now, we can conclude that Greece before the world financial crisis experienced almost 
double real GDP growth than EU 27 and still it was running high deficits, much higher 
deficits than it was usual in the rest of the EU, not meeting the requirement of 3 % by 
far, not taking the advantage of high real GDP growth to reduce its very high 
indebtedness. The loose fiscal policy until the world financial crisis was then quickly 
turned into the fiscal crisis during the world financial crisis, in contrast to most EU 
countries whose fiscal policies were much more prudent before and were able to 
withstand deteriorated deficits. The world financial crisis did not cause the fiscal crisis 
in Greece on its own, because Greece had bad state of its fiscal policy even before, so it 
was not able to absorb the shock of the world financial crisis. 
 
1.3.2. Shadow economy and tax evasion 
 
One of the most important features of Greek economy from the point of view of 
the fiscal policy is the high share of shadow economy on total economy and high rate of 
tax evasion. It is not easy to define shadow economy as different authors use different 
definitions. It will be useful for this thesis to be consistent with the approach of 
Schneider and Enste (1999) who state: “In our analysis of the shadow economy we 
concentrate on legal value added creating activities, which are not taxed or registered 
and where the largest part of them can be classified as „black‟ or clandestine labor.” 
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Figure 8: Size of shadow economy in Greece, Italy, Spain and an unweighted 
average of 21 selected OECD countries
1
 (in % of the GDP) 
 
Note: values for 2010 are provisional 
Source: Schneider (September 2010) 
 
 In the figure 8 we can see the evolution of the size of Greek shadow economy 
and its comparison to the unweighted average of the selected OECD countries (see 
footnote 1) expressed as a share of GDP, which means as a share of the official 
economy. We can clearly see that the Greek economy can be characterized by a big size 
of shadow economy. Even though there are countries with substantially bigger shadow 
economy in the world, those countries are not among developed countries. From OECD 
countries, Greece has the biggest shadow economy. The high share of shadow economy 
is typical for some other South-European countries also, as for Italy and Spain, for 
example. As Schneider (September 2010) states, the decline of the relative size of Greek 
shadow economy until 2008 was caused by growing official economy mainly. Then the 
shadow economy began to rise due to the world financial crisis to 25.0 % in 2009 and 
25.2 % in 2010. 
 The reason why the sizable shadow economy is so harmful for Greek 
government fiscal policy is that activities in the shadow economy are not taxed. It 
means that there are shortfalls of tax collections due to shadow economy. On top of that 
there is also high tax evasion in the official economy in Greece contributing with 
additional tax shortfalls. 
 There are also studies concerning the tax evasion independently from the 
shadow economy. McGee and Tyler (2006) study the attitude of population in 33 
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 Selected 21 OECD countries are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, 
Greece, United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Austria, Portugal, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, U.S.A. 
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different countries (and regions)
2
, including Greece. The used survey data are from 
2004 by Inglehart. The paper shows interesting findings about the survey which asked 
people whether tax evasion is justifiable
3
. From 33 countries Greeks were on the 32nd 
place if we rank the countries from the most opposing to the most agreeing with the tax 
evasion. Only 37 % of Greeks told that tax evasion is never justifiable. The average 
survey rate from all 33 countries was 54.9 %. To compare with the other South-
European countries, the rate was 57 % in Italy, 55 % in Portugal and 57 % in Spain. We 
can see that the tax evasion approval in Greece is Greece specific in the Southern 
Europe unlike the shadow economy. 
 Matsaganis and Flevotomou (January 2010) try to directly estimate the share of 
unreported taxable income and also the amount of tax shortfalls due to the tax evasion. 
The table 3 shows the rate of under-reporting of taxable income in 2004/05 by level of 
income. 
 
Table 3: Rate of under-reporting of income (in EUR per person per year) 
Income group Survey income Tax reported income Difference 
Decile 1 (poorest) 1,963 1,769 -9.9% 
Decile 2 3,540 3,174 -10.4% 
Decile 3 5,667 5,031 -11.2% 
Decile 4 7,079 6,715 -5.1% 
Decile 5 8,191 7,723 -5.7% 
Decile 6 9,867 9,172 -7.0% 
Decile 7 12,298 11,322 -7.9% 
Decile 8 15,447 14,314 -7.3% 
Decile 9 19,869 18,525 -6.8% 
Decile 10 (richest) 39,650 33,839 -14.7% 
Top 1% 96,526 73,732 -23.6% 
Top 0.1% 156,859 126,523 -19.3% 
Total 12,455 11,220 -9.9% 
Source: Matsaganis and Flevotomou (January 2010) 
 
                                                          
2
 Data are taken from a survey in Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany (East), Germany (West), Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and Ukraine 
3
 The question was: „Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always 
be justified, never be justified, or something in between: Cheating on taxes if you have a chance.” 
(McGee and Tyler, 2006) 
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 From the table 3 we can see that in total the unreported taxable income 
accounted for 9.9 % in 2004/05. We can also see that the richest Greeks were more 
involved in tax evasion. Together with the progressive tax system 9.9 % of unreported 
income translated into the tax shortfall of 26.1 % (Matsaganis and Flevotomou (January 
2010)). It is a substantial amount causing important problems from the perspective of 
fiscal policy. 
 
1.3.3. Unemployment 
 
 One of the most palpable problems of Greek economy is the rising level of 
unemployment. In the early 1980s the unemployment was still very low, it was 2.7 % in 
1980, for example, but it started to climb to much higher values quickly. During the 
latest crisis, the unemployment rose to even higher values, not seen in Greece before. 
The estimate of 2011 unemployment rate is currently 14.8 % (IMF Data Mapper, 
Accessed 18 April 2011). Following graph shows the unemployment from 1980 until 
the estimate of 2011 unemployment. 
 
Figure 9: Unemployment in Greece from 1980 until 2011 (in %) 
 
Note: 2011 value is the estimate 
Source: IMF Data Mapper. Accessed 18 April 2011 
 
 The unemployment burdens government budget by two ways. It increases the 
social expenditures and also people not employed in the economy cannot create value 
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which would be eventually taxable. In the following graphs we can see the evolution of 
Greek social spending from 2000 to 2009. 
 
Figure 10: Greek government social spending (in EUR million) 
 
Source: OECD Stat Extracts. Accessed 18 April 2011 
 
 We can see that the social spending continued to grow through the whole period 
except for year 2003. Compound annual growth rate of social expenditures is 
approximately 7.9 % while compound annual growth rate of the GDP is just 
approximately 6.2 %, both in nominal values (OECD Stat Extracts. Accessed 18 April 
2011). It caused an increasing share of social expenditures on GDP in recent years, as 
following graph shows. We can observe that after a reduction in 2003 and 2004 there is 
a gradual increase until 2009. Not having newer data we do not know how the situation 
evolved later, even though it would be very interesting, mainly to see whether current 
fiscal restriction measures are effective in reducing social expenditures. 
 
Figure 11: Share of social expenditures on GDP in Greece (in %) 
 
Source: OECD Stat Extracts. Accessed 18 April 2011 
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 Finally we can say that even though Greece once had very low unemployment 
rate, as low as below 3 %, we have seen its values multiplied during 1980s and 1990s to 
levels over 10 %. Latest world financial crisis pronounced weakness of Greek economy 
in perspective of unemployment when it almost doubled in three years: it was 7.7 % in 
2008 and the latest estimates show it can be approximately 14.8 % in 2011. 
Unemployment is one of the biggest challenges of Greek economy affecting the 
government budget among others.  
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2. Using bond market information for evaluation of 
default risk of a government with regard to Greek fiscal 
crisis 
 
 There are many ways how the risk of default of a government can be evaluated. 
These methods are mostly derived from models for evaluation of default of 
corporations. We will briefly mention the main characteristics of all these methods 
before we will more deeply show the methods using bond market information only. 
Following the approach of Andritzky (2006) we can distinguish two types of models: 
 
1. Structural models 
2. Reduced form models 
 
The structural models are based on the idea that there is some measure that 
represents the capacity of a firm/government to repay its obligations. The default is 
defined in this model as an event when this capacity is reached. Andritzky (2006) 
describe various debt capacity measures which are used in the literature on government 
default risk, such as GDP or foreign reserves and net exports. Generally we can say that 
structural models model default even as endogenous. Bond market information is not 
used in these models. 
On the other hand, reduced form models consider default risk to be an 
exogenous process and do not use any debt capacity measure. Andritzky (2006) differ 
between two categories of reduced form models, equilibrium models and parsimonious 
models. Equilibrium models are based on the no-arbitrage condition. Parsimonious 
models are simple models which in their simplest form try to use solely the bond yield 
spread over the benchmark to calculate the default risk of their issuer. Reduced form 
models will be of our interest, because they often use bond market information to 
evaluate default risk of their issuer. 
To develop model using information from bond market we need to develop it in 
several steps: 
1. We need to build some probability of default concept. 
2. We have to find a way how to calculate probability of default. We will also need 
to lay down several important assumptions in order to be able to do so. 
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3. We have to agree on some estimation strategy of probability of default as 
information of smooth zero coupon yield curve is not available on the bond 
market (we will see that it will be needed) and it is why we cannot calculate the 
probability of default directly but only using estimation. We will see that the 
problem reduces to the estimation of smooth zero coupon bond yield curve. 
 
2.1. Advantages of using bond-based models in the Greek 
fiscal crisis 
 
 Using models based on exploiting bond market information, which is the 
subcategory of reduced form models, brings us many advantages over some more 
complex structural models. The advantages are even more evident in the extreme cases, 
such as the Greek fiscal crisis is.  
  
2.1.1. Relevance 
 
 One could argue that we use just bond default risk to determine the risk of 
default of the whole government. But we will argue here that even though it is just an 
approximation, it is still reasonable to reduce our attention to the government bonds. 
 
Figure 12: The composition of Greek government debt in September 2009 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance of The Helenic Republic (September 2009) 
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Figure 13: The composition of Greek government debt in September 2010 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance of The Helenic Republic (September 2010) 
 
 In figures 12 and 13 you can see the composition of the government debt of 
Greece in September 2009 and in September 2010. The choice of dates has an important 
reason. At first we have to mention that Public Debt Bulletins are only provided 
quarterly by Ministry of Finance of The Helenic Republic (March, June, September and 
December). The September 2009 was chosen to show the state before the crisis (in 
December the crisis has already become) and the September 2010 was chosen to show 
the effect of the international help. 
 We can see that even though the international help reduced the relative 
importance of bonds in the Greek debt portfolio a little, by 5.9 pp, the share was still 
dominant, 76.6 %, more than ¾ of the debt. It means that if we will approximate the 
probability of default of Greek government by the probability of default of their bonds, 
it is very good approximation as we consider the behavior of ¾ of all government 
liabilities. 
 
2.1.2. Simplicity and dynamics 
 
 Even though there are many other models which have deeper and more 
convincing theoretical background, the simplicity, especially of the parsimonious 
models, is important for our purposes. Complex models use much data and often need 
to run heavy calculations and simulations in order to obtain a result. It is not convenient 
for the purposes of this thesis where we want to estimate evolution of the default 
probability on the daily basis and over a long period. 
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 In structural models it is also needed to use historical data over some time 
sample and to estimate their future evolution. We can argue that it is not a good 
approach to use historical data for evaluation of default risk in the extreme cases of 
crises, especially in Greece. At first, used data, such as GDP, usually do not allow 
enough dynamics as they are not published in the desired frequency or we need to use 
estimates based on longer time periods, as warned by Byström and Kwon (2005), which 
reduces possible dynamics as well. Bond market data are high frequency data available 
in the frequency of up to 1 tick resolution in some cases by Reuters, for example 
(Reuters Wealth Manager, 2010), if needed. Secondly, in the crisis there are many 
points in time where important things happen, such as political decisions, which 
dramatically change the default probability, so the high frequency of re-calculation of 
the default probability is needed if we want to catch the effect of those decisions, for 
example. Relying on historical data could lead to out-dated estimates of default 
probability not corresponding to the present situation which changes quickly during the 
crisis. Thirdly, no simulation of future evolution is needed in the parsimonious models 
in order to estimate the future probability of default, because it can be fully estimated 
based on sovereign bond data only of different maturities. 
 
2.1.3. Reliability of the data 
 
 Data from the bond market can be considered to be absolutely reliable in 
contrary to some other Greek data, especially from macroeconomic development. As we 
could see in the chapter 1, for example, data on GDP evolution or data on government 
debt had to be subject to many revisions. The situation could be better if we studied the 
Greek fiscal crisis from a larger time distance, when all corrections needed were done. 
But we can never be truly sure that this condition is met. Data on the bond market come 
from bond bid and ask quotations done by different traders on the market whose names 
are known and well documented (Reuters Wealth Manager). There is no room for need 
of revisions from the nature of trading itself. On the other hand there is much space for 
inaccuracy, both unintentional and intentional, in any accounting data. In the case of 
Greece this space turn up to be heavily misused as the international revisions had to be 
done (see chapter 1) in order to correct the data. However, any revision can be 
considered final for sure. 
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2.2. Probability of default concept 
 
 We will now introduce several definitions related to the concept of probability 
of default which will be crucial for further discussion. We will mainly base them on 
Andritzky (2006). 
 The most intuitive of all functions we will show here is the survival function. By 
the survival function we mean function S(t) defined as:  
  ( )   ,   -     ( ), (2.1) 
where   is the time, when the default occurs, t is any chosen point in time and Q(t) is the 
cumulative distribution function of the default probability, which is defined below by 
(2.3). 
 Survival function can be interpreted as a function which shows what is the 
probability that the asset will not default prior to t, so that the asset will “survive” at 
least until t. It is also needed to define default intensity and cumulative probability of 
default as it is the counterpart of survival function. By default intensity q(t) we mean:  
  ( )   ,   -     
    
( ( )   (    ))  (2.2) 
 It is the density of default probability at time t, in other words it is the 
probability that the default occurs exactly at time t. It is why Q(t), cumulative 
distribution function of default, can be written as a continuous sum of all default 
probabilities until t: 
  ( )  ∫  ( )  
 
  
  (2.3) 
 Andritzky (2006) states that we usually observe time of default from time 0. 
Then we get several desirable properties of default intensity: t > 0,  ( )  〈   〉 
and ( )  ∫  ( )    
 
 
. It means that the default always happens in future, the 
default intensity must be between 0 and 1 as it is required by the probability theory and 
that the default always happens in unlimited time horizon. 
 The last important function for our purposes is the hazard function. The hazard 
function is slightly different from the default intensity, even though it is very similar at 
first sight. Hazard function  ( ) is defined as:  
  ( )     
    
 (        |   )
  
 
 ( )
 ( )
  (2.4) 
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 It is a probability of default at time t given that the default did not occur before t. 
Mathematically there can be done a connection between (2.1), (2.2) and (2.4)
4
: 
      ( ( ))
  
 
 
 ( )
  ( )
  
  
 ( )
 ( )
 (2.5) 
Then together with (2.4) we get: 
 
 ( )   
     ( ( ))
  
  (2.6) 
 
2.3. Calculation of the probability of default 
 
 From the concept introduced above we cannot directly calculate what the 
probability of default equals, because the survival function S(t) in (2.6) is unknown. We 
will derive the probability of default here so that it could be calculated. The main source 
in the following derivation was Andritzky (2006) and Ferstl and Hayden (2010). By 
price of the bond we will mean a percentage of its face value. 
 We will have to build the derivation of the probability of default from several 
different concepts of yields, which we will then put together with the concept of 
probability of default from chapter 2.2. using a few assumptions. 
 A forward rate   (     ) is defined as: 
   (     )  
∫  ( )  
  
  
     
  (2.7) 
where  ( ) is the spot rate in time s. We can view a forward rate   (     ) as an implied 
rate at time 0 for the future time period beginning in time    and ending in time   . 
 Now let B(t,T) be the price of risk-free zero coupon bond at time t with maturity 
T and Z(t,T) be the price of risky zero coupon bond at time t with maturity T. Then 
continuously compounded zero coupon bond yield to maturity of risk-free bond is: 
   (   )   
    (   )  
   
 (2.8) 
and continuously compounded zero coupon bond yield to maturity of risky bond is: 
   (   )   
    (   )
   
  (2.9) 
 The difference between these two yields is called credit spread and it is 
commonly used as a measure of riskiness of the bond, because credit spread is to 
                                                          
4
 Note: we use symbol log(x) for natural logarithm function. 
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compensate the risk which is bearing the risky bond in contrast to the risk-free bond. 
We denote credit spread s(t,T) and we can write: 
  (   )    (   )    (   )  (2.10) 
 In the case of default of the bond, there is a possibility that some value will be 
recovered. Let‟s denote   〈   〉 a recovery rate. The recovery rate can be defined on 
various bases. We will define it as a fraction of market value of the bond that a bond 
holder will be able to get from the bond issuer when the default happens. Proportion 
    of the bond market value will bond holder lose forever. 
 
Assumption 1: We will assume    .  
 It means that we will work with the concept of outright default. Some can argue 
that an outright default is not a reasonable assumption in sovereign bond markets and 
that we should rather use an assumption of debt restructuring so that some value of the 
bond would be recovered (as argues Andritzky (2006) for example). Others also use 
dynamic approach to the recovery ratio which is then allowed to evolve in time (as in 
Byström and Kwon (2005), for example). 
 However using zero recovery rate, we do not make a bad assumption, we just 
measure different thing. We measure the probability of the worst case scenario which 
the outright default is. If the restructuring approach or dynamic restructuring approach 
was used, it could be misleading, especially for the dynamic approach, because we 
would get a probability of default in time, but each time it would be a probability of 
different kind of default. The static approach is crucial for us as we will want to study 
also its evolution in time, so we need the time series of default probabilities to be a 
series of fully comparable numbers. We will just need to remember that we measure 
probability of an outright default, not a probability of default which would happen in 
reality. 
 
Assumption 2: We assume that the default risk is the only type of risk a bond bears. 
 The assumption of default risk being the only risk is needed for computational 
purposes ensuring that the model will remain parsimonious. Among other risks which 
we do not take into account and are also incorporated in sovereign bond valuation is 
interest rate risk, reinvestment risk or inflation risk, for example. 
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Assumption 3: We assume risk-neutral environment. 
 It means that all investors require the risk-free interest rate as an expected return 
on all investments. This assumption implies that we will obtain the risk-neutral default 
probabilities, not the real default probabilities. Byström and Kwon (2005) say that this 
probability is an upper bound of an actual probability. 
 
 We can now begin to calculate the hazard function which is our aim in this 
chapter. From assumption 2 and 3 we can say that the credit spread is only to 
compensate for default risk, because the default risk is the only risk we take into 
account and in addition we impose the assumption of risk-neutral environment. Then: 
  (   )   
   (  (   ) ( ))
   
  (2.11) 
 From (2.10) and assumption 1, where we assume zero recovery rate of risky 
bond, we get: 
  (   )|(   )   
   (   ( ))
   
  
    ( )
   
  (2.12) 
 Let recall that  ( ) denotes continuously compounded spot rate at time t, then 
we can derive the forward rate from the following relationship between spot and 
forward rates: 
   (  )      (     )(     )    (  )    (2.13) 
We can solve the equation for the forward rate in the following way: 
      (  )          (     )(     )       (  )   (2.14) 
  (  )      (     )(     )   (  )   (2.15) 
   (     )  
 (  )    (  )   
     
 (2.16) 
 We also need to define an instantaneous forward rate. We will use previous 
calculations for it: 
  (  )     
     
  (     )     
     
 (  )    (  )   
     
  (2.17) 
which is a special case of the forward rate for some period from t1 to t2, but with t1 and 
t2 being limitedly close, in other words for such a very short period in future that we 
define instantaneous forward rate in one point in time. 
 Having defined the instantaneous forward rate, we can use it to obtain the 
instantaneous forward rate for both risk-free and risky bonds. We will use the 
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expression (2.17) together with (2.8) and (2.9). We denote an instantaneous forward 
rate of risk-free bond as   ( ) and we can simplify it to: 
   ( )   
     ( )
  
 (2.18) 
In the same way we can obtain an instantaneous forward rate of risky bond as: 
   ( )   
     ( )
  
 (2.19) 
 Now we can define, in line with the definition of credit spread, the instantaneous 
forward credit spread. We also impose the assumption that the default risk is the only 
type of risk and we use also risk-neutral environment assumption. Under those 
assumptions we can see that following definition of instantaneous credit spread is 
meaningful. We define an instantaneous forward credit spread as: 
   ( )    ( )   
    (  (   ) ( ))
  
 (2.20) 
 But we can further simplify the expression imposing assumption 1 of zero 
recovery rate and using (2.1) and (2.6): 
   ( )    ( )   
    (   ( ))
  
 (2.21) 
   ( )    ( )   
     ( )
  
 (2.22) 
   ( )    ( )   ( ) (2.23) 
 It means that the instantaneous forward credit spread is, under our assumptions, 
the hazard rate. So the hazard rate of an outright default at some time T is the difference 
between instantaneous forward rates of risky bond and risk-free bond. It means that the 
problem of estimation of default probability is very close to the problem of estimation 
of smooth zero coupon yield curves for both risky and riskless bonds. We have to stress 
once again that the estimate of instantaneous risk of default needs the zero coupon yield 
curve to be smooth, thus differentiable with respect to T to be able to calculate the 
hazard function in parametric form which is a very desirable outcome. 
 
2.4. Estimation of the smooth zero coupon bond yield curve 
 
 As we do not know the smooth zero coupon bond yield curve, but we only know 
data on coupon bonds, we will have to derive the zero coupon bond yield curve from 
coupon bonds data using some estimation procedure. Ferstl and Hayden (2010) show 
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several methods known as Nelson/Siegel and Svensson method and cubic spline 
interpolation method. Those methods are typical parametric and non-parametric 
methods respectively. They also show the implementation of both methods using 
computation software R. We will have to use a parametric model to obtain a curve 
differentiable with respect to time to use it for estimation of hazard rate. 
 
2.4.1. Introduction to the zero coupon bond yield curve estimation 
 
 It is useful to define some new terms related to the estimation of zero coupon 
bond yield curve. Many definitions from previous sections are applicable for estimation 
as well, but we will want to work with definitions re-defined so that they will use matrix 
notation. It is important, because we need to compute with more bonds at once in the 
estimation process and it is more convenient to use matrix notation rather than to 
compute with the system of many equations. The definitions are based on Ferstl and 
Hayden (2010), but the notation had to be changed significantly to be compatible with 
the notation used before. 
 At first we will define several basic bond features in a matrix notation. We 
define a matrix of maturities as: 
   {    }               (2.24) 
We define a matrix of cash flows as: 
   {    }               (2.25) 
 The number of rows t is the number of cash flows of the bonds in the set of all 
bonds with the highest number of cash flows and k is the number of bonds in the set of 
all bonds. Each bond has two pieces of information coded in these two matrices: matrix 
C stores information on all individual cash flows that will be realized to the bondholder 
and matrix M attaches to each cash flow its time of occurrence. If the number of cash 
flows for some bonds is less than for the bond with the most cash flows, remaining cells 
of the matrix are filled with 0. We also count nominal value paid at maturity as one of 
the cash flows. 
 Similarly we define a price vector as: 
        2    
 
 
   3         (2.26) 
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   is the row vector of clean prices of bonds j = 1,…k. In other words, those are the 
quoted prices at the market.   is the row vector of accrued interests related to bonds j = 
1,…k. By the vector of accrued interests we mean: 
   {   
   
 
  
     }                (2.27) 
  
  is the number of days since last coupon payment for j-th bond,   
  is the number of 
days in current coupon period for bond j. 
 To show the relationship between the bond prices and its cash flows we have to 
define a discount factor matrix as: 
   { (    )   
  (    )    }               (2.28) 
where  (    ) denotes the continuously compounded spot rate at time of occurrence of 
an i-th cash flow of j-th bond. 
 We can use the definitions of a price vector and discount factor matrix to obtain 
an expression showing the relationship between the price vector and discount factor: 
     
 
 
    ∑    
 
   
 (    )        (2.29) 
 In the matrix notation the equation can be rewritten as: 
     (   ), (2.30) 
where   denotes a column vector of ones and   denotes element-wise multiplication of 
matrices, not a matrix multiplication. We can also use the relations (2.28) and (2.29) to 
show how we can compute the yield till maturity of coupon bonds. We denote the yield 
till maturity of bond j as yj. Then the yield till maturity is the solution for yj in the 
following equation: 
   
 
    ∑    
 
   
                (2.31) 
 
 For the estimation procedure it will be useful to define a Macaulay duration 
vector. We will define it in this way: 
   
  (        )
  (      )
  (2.32) 
where the division is element-wise and      is the matrix of discount factors using the 
yield till maturity as follows: 
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      *        +              (2.33) 
 
2.4.2. Nelson-Siegel method 
 
 Nelson-Siegel method is one of possible methods for so called indirect 
estimation of zero coupon bond yield curve. It means that we try to find some curve 
which can be described in a parametric way and which satisfies theoretical conditions as 
well as possible. Nelson and Siegel (1987) introduced a parsimonious model for 
modeling yield curves. Ferstl and Hayden (2010) present its implementation for use in 
computation program R. 
 The functional form of the instantaneous forward rate according to Nelson and 
Siegel (1987) used by Ferstl and Hayden (2010) is: 
  (      )          . 
    
 
/    0.
    
 
/    . 
    
 
/1  (2.34) 
where   is the vector of parameters   (          ). When we apply the relation that 
the spot rate is the average of forward rates, which is: 
  (      )  
 
    
∫  (      ) 
    
 
      (2.35) 
we get the relation for the spot curve: 
  (      )       
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/] (2.36) 
 Now we have to estimate the unknown parameter vector  . Ferstl and Hayden 
(2010) use weighted least squares and globally optimal parameter estimation method. 
The method is based on minimizing the error between the observed bond prices and 
theoretical bond prices. At first, they mention the importance of weighting of price 
errors to reduce the problem of heteroskedasticity. For a bond j they use a weigh    in 
the following form: 
    
  
  
∑   
   
   
  (2.37) 
 Then they show the objective function which is used in the optimization 
procedure. It is function  ( ), which has the following form: 
  ( )  (    (      ))    (2.38) 
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 Objective function calculates in fact the weighted errors of estimated bond 
prices for given vector of parameters  . The optimization procedure is based on the idea 
of minimizing the objective function subject to restrictions which are derived in Ferstl 
and Hayden (2010) in the Appendix A. It means that we get the parameters for which 
the pricing of bonds is as precise as possible given the model. 
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3. Using credit default swaps for evaluation of 
government credit risk 
 
 As we mentioned before, using bond market information for estimation of credit 
risk is by far not the only option to try to estimate the credit risk of the government. In 
this chapter the possible use of CDS for this purpose will be discussed as an alternative. 
The main source will be Andritzky (2006). 
 
3.1. CDS as an instrument 
 
 The CDS is a credit derivative instrument developed to provide one party, which 
is called credit protection buyer, insurance against some kinds of credit events 
associated with the underlying asset. CDS is an OTC instrument, so it is negotiated 
directly between counterparties. CDS transfers the credit risk on the other party, which 
is called protection seller. The protection buyer, however, does not have to hold the 
underlying asset to buy a CDS from protection seller. In the following figure we can see 
the cash flow associated with the CDS. 
 
Figure 14: CDS cash flow 
 
Protection buyer 
regularly paid CDS premium 
Protection seller 
 
only if credit event occurs: 
A) physical delivery: 
delivery of underlying asset 
par value of underlying asset 
 
B) cash settlement: 
difference between par value  
and market value of underlying asset 
 
Source: Author‟s figure 
 
 CDS cash flow follows an easy pattern. While no credit event occurs, there are 
only regular payments from protection buyer to protection seller called CDS premium. 
The CDS premium is usually paid quarterly (Andritzky, 2006). While a credit event 
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occurs, there are basically two different kinds of possible settlements. The physical 
delivery means that the protection buyer delivers protection seller the underlying asset 
and protection seller pays protection buyer the par value of the asset. There can be 
defined so-called deliverable bonds, which are bonds accepted in case of physical 
delivery. Then protection buyer delivers CTD (cheapest to deliver) deliverable bond. In 
the case of cash delivery the protection seller pays the protection buyer the difference 
between the par value and market value of the asset. The CDS is negotiated for a 
predefined period of time. CDS is terminated if this time passes or if credit event 
occurs. 
 Andritzky (2006) mention five possible credit events: „(i) a change in coupon 
rates, (ii) a change in principal amount, (iii) a postponement of interest or principal 
payment date, (iv) a change in ranking of priority, and (v) a change in payment of 
interest or principal to a non-permitted currency.“ 
 We will use government bonds as an underlying asset in the case of estimation 
of probability of default of government. Then, if the credit event occurs, the protection 
buyer tries to deliver the protection seller the cheapest-to-deliver bond, because the 
physical delivery is most common in practice (Andritzky, 2006). Within 30 business 
days usually follows the payment of par value by the protection seller (Andritzky, 
2006). 
 
3.2. Fair value of the CDS premium 
 
 A fair value of the CDS premium is determined from equality of two so-called 
“legs”. One leg is called premium leg and expresses the present value of the CDS 
premium. The other leg is called protection leg and it is the present value of the credit 
event. The CDS premium has a fair value if the two legs are equal, so if the protection 
buyer pays the value of premium leg and receives a value of protection leg through the 
CDS contract. We can express this logic more formally. We have to mention that we 
assume risk-neutral probability measure. The present value of premium leg can be 
expressed as: 
  (   )  
 
 
∑    4 ∫        
  
 
5
 
   
  (3.1) 
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where c is the CDS premium (expressed in annual terms), N is the total number of 
premium payments which are assumed to be paid quarterly,    is the time when the i-th 
premium payment is done,    denotes the continuous risk-free interest rate at time t and 
   is the hazard rate of credit event at time t. It means that the value of premium leg 
equals to the sum of values of all future premium payments. Each payment has the 
value equal to the nominal value of it discounted continuously by the risk-free interest 
rate and hazard rate. The discounting by hazard rate is essential as if the credit event 
triggered at time t, the contract would be terminated and no further payments by the 
protection buyer would be done. So there is discounting by the hazard rate of credit 
event to involve this risk in the valuation of premium leg. 
 The rationale behind the present value of protection leg is similar, but it is more 
complicated. The first think we have to bear in mind is that the protection leg‟s value is 
generated by credit event. If there was no probability of credit event, protection leg 
would have no value. We will scale par value of the underlying bond to 1. We denote by 
  the time of default of the bond and by        the settlement day, when protection 
seller pays protection buyer the difference between par value of the bond and fractional 
recovery of the face value which is saved after default at time    (denoted by  (  )) 
and accrued interest  (  ) which protection buyer has to pay also. In addition 
protection seller receives a fraction of CDS premium which is accrued at time of default 
  . The value of the protection leg at time of default is then: 
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(3.2) 
 The recovery value and accrued interest are both discounted at risk-free rate 
during the period between the default and actual settlement between CDS 
counterparties. 
 It is however also needed to compute the present value of the protection leg at 
time 0. It can be expressed as: 
  (     )  ∫ (   ̂(  )   ̂(  )  
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      4 ∫        
 
 
5   (3.3) 
 It means that for every time moment between the time 0 and   , which is the 
time when the last premium payment occurs and CDS is terminated, the value of 
possible credit event at that time is multiplied by hazard rate of the credit event    to 
take into account the probability the payment will actually be done and it is also 
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discounted by the risk-free rate and hazard rate of previous credit events, because it is 
possible that the credit event has already happened by that time and CDS has already 
terminated. 
 The current fair CDS premium, denoted by   
 
 is then determined by the equality 
of premium leg and protection leg. If CDS premium on market is fair, then   
 
 can be 
considered the CDS spread which is quoted. The final equation to determine the fair 
value is then: 
  (    
 )   (    
   ) (3.4) 
 
3.3. The recovery estimation 
 
 The main measure of credit risk in the method proposed by Andritzky (2006) is 
the recovery ratio. There are two different concepts of recovery ratios needed to be 
introduced. The first is so-called RMV, the recovery of market value, and the second 
one is RFV, recovery of face value. Using RMV concept, we mean by recovery ratio the 
pre-default fraction of the market value of the bond that is preserved even after default. 
If we use RFV concept, we mean by recovery ratio the fraction of value of the bond that 
is preserved after default expressed as a percentage of its face value. 
 It is also important to introduce the CDS basis before the estimation of recovery. 
The CDS basis is the difference between the CDS spread and bond spread, both CDS 
and bond having the same maturity. It is the feature that makes the estimation of 
recovery more complicated. CDS basis is positive when CDS premium is higher than 
corresponding bond spread. There are various incentives for CDS basis to raise or lower 
on different occasions. Anything making a CDS contract better for protection buyer 
makes the basis to rise and what makes it worse for protection buyer lowers the basis. 
For example simply the fact that the protection buyer can deliver a bond for its market 
value while is insured at par value rises the basis. On the other hand, the counterparty 
risk, for example, risk of default of the protection seller, can lower the basis. There is, 
however, by far the most important driver, which is the differing concept of recovery in 
CDS and bond point of view. For CDS we use RFV concept (recovery fraction denoted 
by  ) and for bonds we use RMV concept (recovery fraction denoted by  ). It causes 
that CDS spread cannot be, except for special circumstances, equal to the bond‟s spread 
with corresponding maturity. Andritzky (2006) shows that this difference between 
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recovery concepts is so important that it is not convenient “to assess the relative value 
of the position” by the CDS basis and it is better to estimate recovery rate and hazard 
rate. 
 We will now discuss the simplest method Andritzky (2006) shows. It is possible 
to use a model based on no arbitrage in pricing of two instruments: CDS and bond with 
the same or at least very similar maturity as is the length of CDS contract. We can begin 
with the equation for dirty price of a bond: 
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(3.5) 
 The bond pays I coupon payments    at times    for i = 1, …I.   is the recovery 
value using RFV concept.    is the risk-free rate at time t and    is the hazard rate at t. 
The coupon payments are done in discrete time intervals, while the risk of a credit event 
is assumed to be possible any time. Please, note that the equation already considers an 
accrued interest. It can be further expanded by adding following term to the equation: 
 ∑      4 ∫         
  
  
5  
 
     
 (3.6) 
where    are possible so-called amortization payments, payments done usually together 
with coupon payments after some so-called grace period g, which repay some part of 
the par value in advance, feature sometimes occurring for sovereign bonds. 
 The second valuation equation is the equation for CDS spread which can be 
derived from equation (3.4) as a function of hazard rate and recovery of face value: 
     (     ) (3.6) 
 Then we can combine this equation with the equation for market price of bond 
with corresponding maturity, where we assume that current market price is equal to its 
fair value from equation (3.5): 
        (     ) (3.7) 
 If we, in addition, assume constant hazard function and recovery rate function 
for all maturities (but with constant value varying each day), we can solve those two 
equations for    and   , which was our goal. 
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 Andritzky (2006) also shows a three-instrument model, where using additional 
information on CTD bond price it is possible to calculate also the recovery using RMV 
concept, not only RFV as above. It is also possible to complicate the model using non-
constant hazard and recovery rate function. On the other hand we can simplify the 
model considerably by imposing zero recovery rate if we do not mind the loss of 
realism in this way. 
 An interesting extension could be done by allowing the counterparty risk in this 
model, so allowing protection seller to default. A counterparty risk surely plays some 
role which can be negligible if the CDS protection seller is very trustworthy, but should 
not be disregarded as it can bias the estimate produced by the model, because 
counterparty risk lowers the CDS basis. We have to say that it also depends on the fact 
if the counterparty risk is properly perceived by the protection buyer and so if it is 
included properly in the CDS premium and basis respectively. 
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4. Case study of Greek government default risk 
 
 In chapter 2 it was shown how the method of Nelson and Siegel (1987) is 
applicable for estimation of default of a government using government bond market 
information. 
 
4.1. Research aims 
 
 This study will try to estimate the probability of default of Greek government. 
The main reason is to estimate its development during the crisis. We will study the 
period from 17 March 2009 until 9 March 2011. There were no exact dates which 
would be reasonable to select, so a period of almost 2 years was selected to cover the 
period before the Greek debt crisis began also. As the crisis did not come to the end by 
the completion of this thesis, the end of the crisis could not have been covered, 
unfortunately. 
 Using the estimated evolution of probability of default, several hypotheses will 
be tested using the time series analysis to show whether some important events affected 
the probability of default of the Greek government. 
 At last, but not least, it will be also shown what are main advantages and 
disadvantages of use of the bond-based parsimonious method based on Nelson and 
Siegel (1987) described in chapter 2 for purposes of estimation of the probability of 
default.  
 
4.2. Research hypotheses 
 
 There will be studied following hypotheses in this empirical study:  
 
1. 11.11.2009 was the trigger point of the crisis. 
2. The probability of default of Greek government during the Greek fiscal crisis of 
2010 rose significantly. 
3. The probability of default of Greek government fell significantly after the 
announcement of the aid package for Greek government. 
4. The probability of default rose gradually even before the crisis. 
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4.3. Methodology 
 
 We will use the bond-based parsimonious method based on Nelson and Siegel 
(1987) as described in chapter 2. At first we have to choose a benchmark, zero-risk 
government bonds, to be able to estimate the probability of default of another 
government. We have to find such a government bonds which are issued in the same 
currency as Greek government bonds and at the same time the benchmark government 
has to be considered as very credible. The best choice in the Eurozone seems to be the 
German government bonds. 
 Then the zero-coupon yield curve estimation procedure will be done for both 
German and Greek government bonds. The advantage of the chosen parametric method 
is that we can use the parameters (vector  ) from the estimated zero-coupon yield curve 
to directly calculate the instantaneous forward curve for both countries. According to 
the method shown in chapter 2 we can then directly calculate the hazard function for 
each day of the selected period as an instantaneous forward credit spread curve, which 
is the difference between the instantaneous forward rate curve for Greece and Germany. 
 When we gain the estimate of the hazard function of Greece evolving in time, 
we have to decide on the time horizon which we will like to study as we will, in fact, be 
able to estimate the probability of default in any time in future using the estimated 
hazard function. There are, however, some reasonable bounds of time horizon we can 
use. It must be at least 0, it means the probability that the Greek government will default 
at observation day and at most the time horizon of the optimization process, which must 
be set. It was set to 20 year horizon for this study as it was seen as a reasonable upper 
bound, also because just a few observed bonds had longer maturity. 
 For the purposes of the time series analysis we will have to select one certain 
horizon of hazard function to obtain a hazard rate for certain horizon developing in 
time. To set the horizon to 0 can be interesting, because then we measure the current 
default probability as seen by the bond market. However we will see that measuring the 
hazard function at 0 can lead to extreme volatility and extreme values, because the 
shape of hazard function changes very much for low horizons with different data. We 
will discuss later the optimal horizon. 
 For testing of hypothesis 1 we will use a Chow test for structural break. We will 
run three OLS regression models: one will estimate trend of probability of default 
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during the whole tested period, the second will estimate trend during the period before 
11. 11. 2009 and the third will estimate it after 11. 11. 2009. The Chow test should then 
show if the difference between the two periods is so large that it is better to use two 
models for them, in other words, if there is a significant structural break. The Appendix 
4 shows the econometrics of the Chow test. As a source for this appendix serves Baltagi 
(2008). 
  The rise or decline in the probability of default in hypotheses 2, 3 and 4 will be 
tested using OLS estimation procedure for detection of a trend during selected suitable 
time period. The slope parameter of the trend will be then tested for positive or negative 
value. 
 
4.4. The dataset 
 
 The data on German and Greek government bonds were obtained using the 
Reuters Wealth Manager online application. All coupon bonds which existed through 
the entire selected time period and accessible through the student account of Reuters 
Wealth Manager were used. Both governments also issue several bonds in foreign, non-
Euro currencies, which were also omitted. Following table summarizes all bonds 
involved in the study. By the ISIN we can distinguish the German and Greek bonds by 
the code “DE” or “GR”. 34 German and 20 Greek government bonds were used in total. 
 
Table 4: Bonds used for estimation 
 ISIN Coupon rate Issue date Maturity date 
DE0001134468 0.06 20.6.1986 20.6.2016 
DE0001134492 0.05625 31.8.1986 20.9.2016 
DE0001134922 0.0625 4.1.1994 4.1.2024 
DE0001135044 0.065 4.7.1997 4.7.2027 
DE0001135069 0.05625 23.1.1998 4.1.2028 
DE0001135085 0.0475 9.10.1998 4.7.2028 
DE0001135143 0.0625 21.1.2000 4.1.2030 
DE0001135176 0.055 27.10.2000 4.1.2031 
DE0001135184 0.05 25.5.2001 4.7.2011 
DE0001135192 0.05 4.1.2002 4.1.2012 
DE0001135200 0.05 5.7.2002 4.7.2012 
DE0001135218 0.045 10.1.2003 4.1.2013 
DE0001135226 0.0475 31.1.2003 4.7.2034 
DE0001135234 0.0375 4.7.2003 4.7.2013 
DE0001135242 0.0425 31.10.2003 4.1.2014 
DE0001135259 0.0425 28.5.2004 4.7.2014 
DE0001135267 0.0375 26.11.2004 4.1.2015 
DE0001135275 0.04 28.1.2005 4.1.2037 
DE0001135283 0.0325 20.5.2005 4.7.2015 
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DE0001135291 0.035 25.11.2005 4.1.2016 
DE0001135309 0.04 19.5.2006 4.7.2016 
DE0001135317 0.0375 17.11.2006 4.1.2017 
DE0001135325 0.0425 26.1.2007 4.7.2039 
DE0001135333 0.0425 25.5.2007 4.7.2017 
DE0001135341 0.04 16.11.2007 4.1.2018 
DE0001135358 0.0425 30.5.2008 4.7.2018 
DE0001135366 0.0475 25.7.2008 4.7.2040 
DE0001135374 0.0375 14.11.2008 4.1.2019 
DE0001141489 0.035 24.3.2006 8.4.2011 
DE0001141497 0.035 29.9.2006 14.10.2011 
DE0001141505 0.04 30.3.2007 13.4.2012 
DE0001141513 0.0425 28.9.2007 12.10.2012 
DE0001141521 0.035 28.3.2008 12.4.2013 
DE0001141539 0.04 26.9.2008 11.10.2013 
GR0110019214 0.038 1.2.2008 20.3.2011 
GR0114019442 0.039 24.5.2006 20.8.2011 
GR0114020457 0.041 2.3.2007 20.8.2012 
GR0114021463 0.04 26.3.2008 20.8.2013 
GR0114022479 0.055 28.1.2009 20.8.2014 
GR0124015497 0.0535 30.1.2001 18.5.2011 
GR0124018525 0.0525 17.1.2002 18.5.2012 
GR0124021552 0.046 17.1.2003 20.5.2013 
GR0124024580 0.045 13.1.2004 20.5.2014 
GR0124026601 0.037 22.2.2005 20.7.2015 
GR0124028623 0.036 18.1.2006 20.7.2016 
GR0124029639 0.043 17.1.2007 20.7.2017 
GR0124030645 0.046 13.5.2008 20.7.2018 
GR0124031650 0.06 11.3.2009 19.7.2019 
GR0128001584 0.075 20.5.1998 20.5.2013 
GR0128002590 0.065 11.1.1999 11.1.2014 
GR0133001140 0.065 22.10.1999 22.10.2019 
GR0133002155 0.059 24.4.2002 22.10.2022 
GR0133003161 0.047 30.5.2007 20.3.2024 
GR0138001673 0.045 7.3.2005 20.9.2037 
Source: Reuters Wealth Manager 
 
 Data on daily closing prices of these bonds were obtained and their basic 
specification, like ISIN number, coupon rate, issue date and maturity date were obtained 
from the online Reuters database, but several other features had to be calculated, 
because they were not directly available from the database and they were needed by the 
R package termstrc by Hayden and Ferstl (2010). Data which were to be calculated 
were accrued interest of each bond for each day of the studied time period and also all 
future cash flows from all bonds from the perspective of all days in the studied time 
period. The calculation of all these values was programmed in VBA, using which also 
much other necessary preparation of data was done in order to make them usable in R 
package termstrc. 
 As far as the time period is concerned, Germany and Greece do have different 
trading days, so only the shared trading days were considered, as the method needs 
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always both studied and benchmark bonds to be traded on the day for which we want to 
run the estimation procedure. There were 474 shared trading days from 17 March 2009 
until 9 March 2011. 
 
4.5. The estimates 
 
 At first, the estimates of vector of parameters beta were run. The range of 
maturities was set from 0 to 20. The estimation package termstrc also allows us to 
impose constraints for a parameter tau. There were set no constraints. We have to 
mention that the use of constraints for tau is recommended by Ferstl and Hayden for 
performance reasons together with the reasons of smoother evolution of parameters, 
because solutions out of bounds even with better values of objective function are not 
taken into account, which can lead to more similar results, but with the loss of precision. 
Graphs in Appendix 5 show the evolution of parameters for Germany and Greece using 
estimation procedure with stated settings. 
 
4.5.1. Instantaneous forward curves 
 
 Using estimated parameters we can compute the estimated instantaneous 
forward curves. Following graph shows the resulting instantaneous forward curves for 
the entire period from 17 March 2009 until 9 March 2011 for Germany. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 
Figure 15: Estimated instantaneous forward curve of Germany evolving in time 
(17 March 2009 until 9 March 2011) 
 
Source: Author‟s computations 
 
 The axis “Day number” tells us on what day we are observing the instantaneous 
forward rate curve. It ranges from 17 March 2009 until 9 March 2011. On the axis 
“Time horizon” we can see for what time horizon the instantaneous forward rate is 
valid. The axis “Instantaneous forward rate” shows the estimated value of the forward 
rate for a given day and time horizon in %. 
 We can see in fact two notable features of this graph. At first, some values go 
below zero for very small time horizons. The second feature are two very different 
curves not smoothly fitting into other curves. Those two features are caused by the 
optimization procedure and by the properties of Nelson and Siegel curve. They cannot 
be avoided for our dataset with the used method. The negative instantaneous forward 
rates are, however, especially for short time horizons, not so unrealistic in case of 
Germany, which is usually used as a benchmark country with lowest interest rates in the 
EU. 
 The situation is however much more unusual for the estimated instantaneous 
forward curves of Greece which exhibited the fiscal crisis. Following graph shows them 
for the whole period. 
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Figure 16: Estimated instantaneous forward curve of Greece evolving in time (17 
March 2009 until 9 March 2011) 
 
Source: Author‟s computations 
 
 The graph is now turned by approximately 90° clockwise to be able to better 
observe the estimated curves. We can clearly see that the behavior of instantaneous 
forward rate for low time horizons is very unrealistic as it reaches almost 300 % in peak 
during the crisis. To show if the curves are actually fitting our data well while they have 
relatively extreme shapes, mainly for Greece, we can compute RMSE for both Greece 
and Germany. Following table shows the results of this goodness of fit measure. RMSE 
is shown both for bond prices and for yields until maturity. Please note that the results 
are in absolute values and that the prices of the bonds were scaled to the nominal value 
of 100. 
 
Table 5: RMSE of the model for prices and yields 
 Greece Germany 
price 1.500243 1.93726 
yield 1.558057 1.14683 
Source: Author‟s computations 
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 For the case of Greece, several other estimates were run using restrictions on tau 
parameter proposed by Ferstl and Hayden (2010) to achieve smoother evolution of 
parameters and also to achieve more realistic values of instantaneous forward curves at 
zero. Any restrictions, however, lead to the increase in RMSE and the unrealistically 
high levels of instantaneous forward rates at 0 were not lowered. Because of this we 
will use the original results further claiming that they are the best results we can obtain 
using our method on our dataset. 
 The high values of instantaneous forward rates at 0 are caused by the lack of 
observations of bonds with zero or very short time to maturity. Even though there are 
observations with relatively short time to maturity, it is still not sufficient. The curve 
which we try to fit using our data can fit well the bonds in the dataset, but when we 
cannot observe bonds with no or very few days to maturity, it causes the curve to have 
very volatile slope for those non-observed time horizons, because it does not try to fit 
any values there. We will, however, try to solve this issue as well as possible. 
 
4.5.2. Hazard function 
 
 Using the estimated instantaneous forward curves we can derive the hazard 
function evolving in time for Greece. As we know from the methodological part, we can 
get the hazard function as a difference between Greek and German instantaneous 
forward curves assuming no recovery. Please note that if we used changing recovery 
rate, we would get a series of hazard functions which would not be comparable over 
time, which we need for time series analysis. If we included a recovery rate, we would 
increase the estimate of probability of default, so we can say the hazard rate computed 
using no recovery is a lower bound of hazard rates supposing any rate of recovery. So 
we can interpret it as an estimate of hazard rate of Greece supposing no recovery even 
though in reality some recovery is highly probable. However it is also interesting for our 
purposes, because we are mainly interested in the evolution of the probability of default 
rather than in the actual probability of default supposing some changing recovery value. 
 Below we can see the estimated evolution of the hazard function. To familiarize 
with the meaning of the picture, it is the best approach to imagine that we can choose a 
day from 17 March 2009 and 9 March 2011 and observe it. The chosen day is one of the 
days from the axis “Day number”. The day number is the ordinal number of the day in 
whole set of observed days (we observe only days when both Greek and German bond 
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markets were open). Then the axis “Hazard rate” shows the hazard rate in some time 
horizon on axis “Time horizon” in years from the point of view of the chosen day. The 
hazard rate is here the probability of default of Greek government at time given by the 
time horizon given that the government had not defaulted yet. 
 
Figure 17: Estimated hazard function of Greece supposing no recovery (17 March 
2009 until 9 March 2011) 
 
Source: Author‟s computations 
 
 We can see that the hazard rate for short time horizons was very high during the 
worst periods of the crisis. It was more than 100 % which is not possible as 100 % 
means certainty and there can be no higher value of probability than certainty. This 
outcome is however expectable from the instantaneous forward rate curve estimates 
from previous section. It however can still make sense to use these estimates as a 
measure of risk if we approach them carefully as proposed below. 
 
4.5.3. Testing of hypotheses 
 
 We will now try to select a proper time series for our next step which will be the 
analysis of evolution of probability of default. The most desirable from the theoretical 
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point of view it would be to measure the hazard rate at time 0, which is the current 
probability of default implied by the bond market as seen by the investors. We have to 
choose between more desired short time horizon and longer time horizon we have data 
for and therefore the estimates are more reliable for it. In following graphs we can see 
the evolution of hazard rates for several different time horizons. 
 
Figure 18: Hazard rate at year 0 from 17 March 2009 till 9 March 2011 
 
Source: Author‟s computations 
 
Figure 19: Hazard rate at years 1 to 4 from 17 March 2009 till 9 March 2011 
 
Source: Author‟s computations 
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 The graphs show the evolution of the hazard rate through the observed time 
period for chosen time horizons. We can get those graphs by making a “slice” through 
the three-dimensional graphs of estimated hazard functions at some time horizon 
through observed time period. The result is that we obtain a hazard rate, in other words 
the probability of default of Greek government at some time horizon given that the 
default did not occur in earlier time horizon. This hazard rate is then evolving in time 
from 17 March 2009 to 9 March 2011. 
 To quickly interpret the estimated probabilities we can also show how the 
estimates could be used in practice. Let‟s take as an example 9 March 2011, last 
observed day. Let us assume that we want to calculate a total probability that Greece 
will default within 2 years from that day. At that day the hazard rate for year 0 was 
almost 0, for year 1 it was 7.9 % and for year 2 approximately 8.8 %. For a very quick 
estimate we can use discrete approach instead of continuous one. We know that hazard 
rate is probability of default at given time given that the default did not happen before. 
The probability that the default would occur in the 1
st
 year would be roughly 7.9 %, 
because there was 0 probability it would happen before. But it is now 7.9 % that it will 
happen in year 1, so the probability that it will happen in year 2 is just approximately 
(1-0.079) × 0.088 = 8.1 %. So the probability that the Greek government will survive 2 
years is roughly (1-0.079) × (1-0.081) = 84.6 %. The probability of default within 2 
years is then approximately 15.4 %. 
 We can see that the evolution of hazard rate at year 0 is different from other 
horizons. The rates are much higher and are much more concentrated around certain 
periods. The longer the horizon is the lower the rates in crisis periods and they tend to 
be slightly higher in the pre-crisis period. It shows that in the period of crisis hazard 
function tend to be of inverted, hyperbolic, shape. The big difference between zero 
horizon and longer horizons confirms our idea suggested above that we should not use 
the zero horizon for our further analysis, because the zero horizon is affected by the 
disadvantages of our method. To make our results more reliable we will use four time 
horizons, years 1 until 4, for our analysis. Now we can begin to test our hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 1: 11 November 2009 was the trigger point of the crisis. 
 
 We mean by the trigger point of the crisis the point in time when the market-
implied probability of default of Greek government started to grow. It is in fact the 
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moment when investors saw that the imbalanced Greek fiscal policy can lead to 
unsustainable situation. 1 November 2009 was chosen based on the historical chapter 
1.2.1. It was a day when the official EU document was released updating the estimate of 
2010 deficit showing it is expected to be almost doubled and the document also 
concluded the poor effort done by the government to cope with the budget. Both 
information were new and important bad news which make it possible to think that that 
day was the trigger point of the crisis. 
 At first the trend was estimated by the OLS method and then the Chow test was 
run to test the trend of hazard rates for structural break on 11 November 2009. 
Following table summarize all tests. 
 
Table 6: Chow tests for structural break on 11 November 2009 
 restricted model unrestricted model  
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1 
0.0051 
(0.5964) 
0.0345 
(0.0031) 
43.57 % 
2.4971 
(0.4129) 
-0.0080 
(0.0042) 
-1.3193 
(2.0850) 
0.0396 
(0.0075) 
45.77 % 1.1e-020 
2 
0.3894 
(0.4123) 
0.0259 
(0.0018) 
69.01 % 
3.2888 
(0.2101) 
-0.0131 
(0.0024) 
-4.2258 
(0.8486) 
0.0432 
(0.0038) 
73.94 % 8.7e-049 
3 
-0.0214 
(0.3992) 
0.0227 
(0.0015) 
73.14 % 
3.1222 
(0.1438) 
-0.0132 
(0.0018) 
-6.2259 
(0.5374) 
0.0451 
(0.0027) 
83.31% 5.4e-066 
4 
-0.3108 
(0.3682) 
0.0208 
(0.0013) 
74.94 % 
2.6632 
(0.0951) 
-0.0108 
(0.0012) 
-6.4896 
(0.4349) 
0.0420 
(0.0019) 
88.07 % 7.8e-112 
Note: there are standard errors in the brackets below the estimated parameters 
Source: Author‟s computations 
 
 We can see that we can highly significantly reject the Chow test‟s null 
hypothesis in all four cases. It means that we should rather use the unrestricted model 
with structural break than restricted model. We have to bear in mind that the exact 
location of structural break on 11 November 2009 is, however, not guaranteed, but it is 
not possible to reject it. If we ran the test on several other dates we would possibly see 
that the null hypothesis would be rejected also. But we can say that it is not true that the 
11 November 2009 is not the trigger point of the Greek crisis. Together with the 
evidence of events which took place on 11 November 2009 described in the historical 
part of the thesis we can say it is at least reasonable to consider 11 November 2009 the 
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trigger point of the crisis. For purposes of further analysis we will use this day as the 
day when the crisis begun. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The probability of default of Greek government during the Greek fiscal 
crisis of 2010 rose significantly. 
 
 We will now assume that the crisis begun on 11 November 2009. Using the OLS 
method we will test whether there is a significant slope of a trend during the crisis. We 
will apply this procedure on all four time horizons as before. The estimated simple 
models are shown in the following table. 
 
Table 7: Models of trend of hazard rates at years 1 to 4 from 11 November 2009 
until 9 March 2011 
 model of trend 
horizon constant trend parameter    p-value 
1 
1,1778 
(2,0438) 
0,0316 
(0,0062) 
18.85 % 7,3e-007 
2 
-0,9370 
(0,8236) 
0,0301 
(0,0030) 
55.21 % 2,4e-021 
3 
-3,1037 
(0,5172) 
0,0318 
(0,0021) 
74.95 % 6,2e-041 
4 
-3,8264 
(0,4231) 
0,0312 
(0,0015) 
82.99 % 2,0e-059 
Note 1: there are standard errors in the brackets below the estimated parameters 
Note 2: time variable begins from 144, which is 11 November 2009 
Source: Author‟s computations 
 
 The p-value in the table is the p-value of a t-test with the null hypothesis that the 
trend parameter estimate is zero. If we reject the null hypothesis we can conclude that 
the trend parameter is significantly distinct from zero. We can see that for all time 
horizons the estimate of trend slope is positive and highly significant. We can conclude 
that the probability of default rose significantly during the Greek crisis. 
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Hypothesis 3: The probability of default of Greek government fell significantly after 
the announcement of the aid package for Greek government. 
 
 The aid package for Greek government was announced on 25 March 2010, it 
however did not have a concrete form, which it gained on 11 April 2010. We will test 
both dates for the decrease in the hazard rate at years 1 to 4. We will test a short-run 
behavior of the hazard rate, so we will test only 30 observable days following the tested 
dates for negative slope of trend estimate using OLS method, which should be 
sufficiently short period to represent short-run behavior, still long enough for statistical 
reasons. Following two tables show the results of testing. 
 
Table 8: Models of trend of hazard rates at years 1 to 4 from 26 March 2010 until 
10 May 2010 (30 observations) 
 model of trend 
horizon constant trend parameter    p-value 
1 
-27,6921 
(10,3200) 
0,1426 
(0,0419) 
39.66 % 0,0020 
2 
-9,5429 
(5,3014) 
0,0614 
(0,0215) 
35.37 % 0,0081 
3 
-5,8852 
(5,3140) 
0,0379 
(0,0217) 
25.21 % 0,0911 
4 
-5,2621 
(4,4714) 
0,0314 
(0,0182) 
25.68 % 0,0954 
Note 1: there are standard errors in the brackets below the estimated parameters 
Note 2: time variable begins from 235, which is 26 March 2010 
Source: Author‟s computations 
 
Table 9: Models of trend of hazard rates at years 1 to 4 from 12 April 2010 until 21 
May 2010 (30 observations) 
 model of trend 
horizon constant trend parameter    p-value 
1 
-35,9117 
(9,0776) 
0,1743 
(0,0359) 
38.09 % 4,1e-05 
2 
-20,2444 
(4,7929) 
0,1030 
(0,0187) 
46.84 % 7.0e-06 
3 
-22,2538 
(5,6062) 
0,1019 
(0,0220) 
50.17 % 7,6e-05 
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4 
-20,7735 
(5,0746) 
0,0923 
(0,0199) 
53.69 % 7,4e-05 
Note 1: there are standard errors in the brackets below the estimated parameters 
Note 2: time variable begins from 244, which is 12 April 2010 
Source: Author‟s computations 
 
 If we look at the results for the first time period, after the first announcement of 
possible aid package, we can reject the hypothesis of falling hazard rates for all time 
horizons, because the trend slope estimate is for the first two cases positive and 
significantly different from zero and for years 3 and 4 we cannot say they are different 
from zero on widely used 5 % level of significance. The results for the second date, 
after the aid package was specified better, are even more convincing with lower p-
values and higher slope parameters. 
 
Hypothesis 4: The probability of default rose gradually even before the crisis. 
 
 We will test this hypothesis using OLS estimation method of trend from the 
beginning of observation period, 17 March 2009, until the beginning of the crisis on 11 
November 2009. If the trend will be negative, we will reject the hypothesis. We will 
again test the trend time horizons of 1 to 4 years of hazard rate. Following table 
summarizes the results. 
 
Table 10: Models of trend of hazard rates at years 1 to 4 from 17 March 2009 until 
11 November 2009 
 model of trend 
horizon constant trend parameter    p-value 
1 
2,4981 
(0,4214) 
-0,0080 
(0,0043) 
6.58 % 0,0640 
2 
3,2804 
(0,1982) 
-0,0129 
(0,0022) 
56.12 % 2,3e-08 
3 
3,1131 
(0,1271) 
-0,0130 
(0,0015) 
72.89 % 2,8e-14 
4 
2,6568 
(0,0826) 
-0,0107 
(0,0010) 
78.45 % 7,4e-05 
Note: there are standard errors in the brackets below the estimated parameters 
Source: Author‟s computations 
 
69 
 The results suppose we should reject the hypothesis that the probability of 
default rose gradually even before the crisis. For the first time horizon we cannot say the 
slope is different from zero and in all other cases it is significantly negative. It means 
that the hazard rate implied by the bond markets even tended to decline before the crisis. 
 
4.6. Advantages and disadvantages of the method 
 
 For our purposes we needed a method which would have daily data available for 
the estimation of evolution of probability of default. The used method, unlike many 
other methods, was able to match this criterion using reliable daily data from bond 
markets. Because we needed the estimates to be run on each day of the very long 
observation period of 474 days, the method which would offer simple enough 
computation procedure was needed. Even though the method used is relatively 
parsimonious, the computations using available computer were very time consuming, 
however still feasible, which is another advantage of the method. Byström and Kwon 
(2005) also state that one of the main advantages when we use bond-based 
parsimonious methods is that we rely only on the present market data, so “it reflects the 
present and not the past”. 
 There are also several disadvantages of the method. The main disadvantage 
seem to be the above discussed unrealistic behavior of the hazard rate for short time 
horizons, because we do not observe any bonds with such a short time to maturity. It led 
to unrealistically high probability of default at time 0 higher than 100 % for some time 
periods. Due to that we had to omit using the current probability of default in further 
analysis and we had to use only hazard rates for longer time horizons to try to describe 
the evolution of probability of default. 
 
4.7. Conclusions of the research 
 
 The research part of the thesis tried to pinpoint several interesting features of the 
Greek crisis. The first hypothesis served mainly as a supplementary hypothesis for 
further testing. It was shown that it is reasonable to consider 11 November 2009 as a 
trigger point of the crisis. It is important to say that this day the crisis was not created, it 
only started to be reflected by the bond market. The real causes of the crisis originate 
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many years before this date. The rising bond market implied default risk of Greek 
government was just a sign that the bad fiscal situation of a government gone too far 
and investors became to worry about the possible default. 
 We also asked in the fourth hypothesis if investors became to worry about the 
situation gradually even before this trigger point. It was shown that they did not. The 
implied hazard rates were even slowly lowering. It can be a sign that bond markets are 
short sighted to a certain degree. The danger had to surpass some notional level to 
investors to become to worry about the situation. 
 The results of testing of hypothesis 2 showed that the hazard rates rose 
significantly during the Greek crisis, so investors evaluated bonds in such a manner that 
they believed that the fiscal crisis of Greece may lead to default more and more 
probably. From the testing of hypothesis 3 we can see that even the introduction of the 
aid package did not lead to the calming of the markets. 
 
  
71 
Summary 
 
 In the first chapter we described the history of the Greek fiscal crisis. We saw 
that the recent world economic crisis was not the real cause of the crisis in Greece. The 
world economic crisis was just the catalyzer of long term problems with fiscal policy in 
Greece which accelerated the process. The real causes of the crisis go back as far as to 
1970s and 1980s, to the period when the government debt was built up. We also tried to 
find the most palpable problems of Greek contemporary economy related to the fiscal 
deficit. We saw that the Greek government should pay attention at first to the tax 
evasion, shadow economy and high and rising unemployment rate. 
 In the second chapter we studied the methodology of using bond market 
information for evaluation of probability of default of Greek government. We described 
simple parsimonious method, which estimates the evolution of the hazard function of 
government bonds through the selected period in several steps. At first, using daily data 
from coupon bond market data we estimate the zero coupon bond yield curve in Nelson-
Siegel parametric form for a studied country and its benchmark, Greece and Germany in 
our case. Then we imposed three important assumptions. At first, we assumed that the 
recovery rate of bonds in case of credit default would be zero, so that the creditors 
would not get anything in the case of default. This unrealistic assumption was imposed 
in order to both simplify the calculations and enable the estimates to be fully 
comparable during the studied time period. We also assume that the default risk is the 
only type of risk a bond bears and that we are in a risk-neutral environment. After those 
simplifications we were able to easily obtain the hazard function estimates as an 
instantaneous forward credit spread calculated using the estimated parameters of zero 
coupon bond yield curves of a studied country and its benchmark. 
 In the third chapter we discussed a possible use of the credit default swaps for 
evaluation of the credit risk of a government. The advantage of the presented method is 
the possibility to estimate both hazard rate and recovery value, not only hazard rate as 
by the previous method. The practical use of the method is, however, complicated due 
to the fact that CDS data are not easily obtained as CDS are OTC contracts.  
 In the fourth chapter the methodology introduced in the second chapter is 
applied on the case study of Greece. The hazard function is estimated for each day from 
11 November 2009 until 9 March 2011 where the data were available for both Greece 
and Germany, totaling to 474 days. We used a sample of 34 German and 20 Greek 
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government bonds denominated in EUR. The data were retrieved from the Reuters 
Wealth Manager online application and adjusted for calculations using VBA. The 
estimation was done in the R program using the package called termstrc. After the 
estimation we have revealed the drawback of the used method. The estimated evolution 
of the hazard rate at zero horizon showed to be very unstable in time and unrealistically 
high in some cases, exceeding 100 %. It can be caused by the lack of bonds with a very 
short time to maturity in the sample and by the shape of used Nelson-Siegel curves. It is 
why we had to use only longer-time-horizon hazard rates to estimate the evolution of 
the probability of default and we also did not calculate the total probability of default, 
we just analyzed the hazard rates one by one. We studied the evolution of hazard rates 
for 1 to 4 year time horizons in one year steps through the whole period of 474 days. 
 In the analytical part of the study we found that probability of Greece, using our 
method, rose significantly from 11 November 2009, which is the date we discussed why 
and tested that it can be considered the beginning of the recent Greek crisis. 
Surprisingly, even the introduction of the aid package for Greece, consisting of a huge 
amount of EUR 110 billion loan facility, showed not to be able to convince investors 
and did not lower the probability of default of Greek government. But the most 
interesting finding was that before the crisis the probability of default had even lowered 
and then it suddenly changed its trend upward, even though the Greek fiscal problems 
were founded on the policy changes in 1970s and 1980s, as shown in chapter 1. It is 
why we can believe that bond markets are short-sighted and do not reflect the long term 
problems well. 
 There are several possible further research questions which can be studied about 
the Greek fiscal crisis. At first, a better model could be introduced, which would 
provide a more realistic estimate of the evolution of the hazard function, but still 
remaining parsimonious. We have to mention that even using the model used in this 
thesis is relatively computationally demanding, because the estimation procedure is 
computed for many days. Any further important complication of the model could make 
it unusable in practice. It would be also interesting to use the method using CDS 
information and to compare the results with the results from the bond market based 
estimation. It could be also interesting to extend the research to several other countries 
and to make a comparative study of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, for 
example and also, among others, see if the estimation problems of the used method are 
only country specific or if they would cause problems generally. 
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I 
Appendix 1: Government debt in EU 27 countries (in % of GDP) 
 
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
EU (27 countries) 61.9 61.0 60.4 61.9 62.2 62.8 61.5 58.8 61.8 74.0 
Austria 66.5 67.1 66.5 65.5 64.8 63.9 62.1 59.3 62.5 67.5 
Belgium 107.9 106.6 103.5 98.5 94.2 92.1 88.1 84.2 89.6 96.2 
Bulgaria 74.3 67.3 53.6 45.9 37.9 29.2 21.6 17.2 13.7 14.7 
Cyprus 48.7 52.1 64.6 68.9 70.2 69.1 64.6 58.3 48.3 58.0 
Czech Republic 18.5 24.9 28.2 29.8 30.1 29.7 29.4 29.0 30.0 35.3 
Denmark 52.4 49.6 49.5 47.2 45.1 37.8 32.1 27.4 34.2 41.4 
Estonia 5.1 4.8 5.7 5.6 5.0 4.6 4.4 3.7 4.6 7.2 
Finland 43.8 42.5 41.5 44.5 44.4 41.7 39.7 35.2 34.1 43.8 
France 57.3 56.9 58.8 62.9 64.9 66.4 63.7 63.8 67.5 78.1 
Germany 59.7 58.8 60.4 63.9 65.8 68.0 67.6 64.9 66.3 73.4 
Greece 103.4 103.7 101.7 97.4 98.6 100.0 106.1 105.0 110.3 126.8 
Hungary 55.0 52.0 55.6 58.4 59.1 61.8 65.7 66.1 72.3 78.4 
Ireland 37.8 35.6 32.2 31.0 29.7 27.4 24.8 25.0 44.3 65.5 
Italy 109.2 108.8 105.7 104.4 103.8 105.8 106.6 103.6 106.3 116.0 
Latvia 12.3 14.0 13.5 14.6 14.9 12.4 10.7 9.0 19.7 36.7 
Lithuania 23.7 23.1 22.3 21.1 19.4 18.4 18.0 16.9 15.6 29.5 
Luxembourg 6.2 6.3 6.3 6.1 6.3 6.1 6.7 6.7 13.6 14.5 
Malta 55.9 62.1 60.1 69.3 72.3 70.1 63.4 61.7 63.1 68.6 
Netherlands 53.8 50.7 50.5 52.0 52.4 51.8 47.4 45.3 58.2 60.8 
Poland 36.8 37.6 42.2 47.1 45.7 47.1 47.7 45.0 47.1 50.9 
Portugal 50.5 52.9 55.6 56.9 58.3 63.6 63.9 62.7 65.3 76.1 
Romania 22.5 25.7 24.9 21.5 18.7 15.8 12.4 12.6 13.4 23.9 
Slovakia 50.3 48.9 43.4 42.4 41.5 34.2 30.5 29.6 27.8 35.4 
Slovenia : 26.8 28.0 27.5 27.2 27.0 26.7 23.4 22.5 35.4 
Spain 59.3 55.5 52.5 48.7 46.2 43.0 39.6 36.1 39.8 53.2 
Sweden 53.6 54.4 52.6 52.3 51.1 50.8 45.0 40.0 38.2 41.9 
United Kingdom 41.0 37.7 37.5 39.0 40.9 42.5 43.4 44.5 52.1 68.2 
Source: Eurostat Statistics Database. Accessed 23 November 2010 
II 
Appendix 2: Net lending (+)/net borrowing (-) of general government in EU 27 
countries (in % of GDP) 
 
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
EU (27 countries) 0.6 -1.4 -2.5 -3.1 -2.9 -2.5 -1.5 -0.9 -2.3 -6.8 
Austria -1.7 0.0 -0.7 -1.4 -4.4 -1.7 -1.5 -0.4 -0.5 -3.5 
Belgium 0.0 0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -2.7 0.2 -0.3 -1.3 -6.0 
Bulgaria -0.3 0.6 -0.8 -0.3 1.6 1.9 1.9 1.1 1.7 -4.7 
Cyprus -2.3 -2.2 -4.4 -6.5 -4.1 -2.4 -1.2 3.4 0.9 -6.0 
Czech Republic -3.7 -5.6 -6.8 -6.6 -3.0 -3.6 -2.6 -0.7 -2.7 -5.8 
Denmark 2.3 1.5 0.4 0.1 2.1 5.2 5.2 4.8 3.4 -2.7 
Estonia -0.2 -0.1 0.3 1.7 1.6 1.6 2.4 2.5 -2.8 -1.7 
Finland 6.8 5.0 4.0 2.4 2.3 2.7 4.0 5.2 4.2 -2.5 
France -1.5 -1.5 -3.1 -4.1 -3.6 -2.9 -2.3 -2.7 -3.3 -7.5 
Germany  1.3 -2.8 -3.7 -4.0 -3.8 -3.3 -1.6 0.3 0.1 -3.0 
Greece -3.7 -4.5 -4.8 -5.6 -7.5 -5.2 -5.7 -6.4 -9.4 -15.4 
Hungary -3.0 -4.0 -8.9 -7.2 -6.4 -7.9 -9.3 -5.0 -3.7 -4.4 
Ireland 4.8 0.9 -0.3 0.4 1.4 1.6 2.9 0.0 -7.3 -14.4 
Italy -0.8 -3.1 -2.9 -3.5 -3.5 -4.3 -3.4 -1.5 -2.7 -5.3 
Latvia -2.8 -2.1 -2.3 -1.6 -1.0 -0.4 -0.5 -0.3 -4.2 -10.2 
Lithuania -3.2 -3.6 -1.9 -1.3 -1.5 -0.5 -0.4 -1.0 -3.3 -9.2 
Luxembourg  6.0 6.1 2.1 0.5 -1.1 0.0 1.4 3.7 3.0 -0.7 
Malta -6.2 -6.4 -5.5 -9.8 -4.7 -2.9 -2.7 -2.3 -4.8 -3.8 
Netherlands 2.0 -0.2 -2.1 -3.1 -1.7 -0.3 0.5 0.2 0.6 -5.4 
Poland -3.0 -5.3 -5.0 -6.2 -5.4 -4.1 -3.6 -1.9 -3.7 -7.2 
Portugal -2.9 -4.3 -2.8 -2.9 -3.4 -6.1 -4.1 -2.8 -2.9 -9.3 
Romania -4.7 -3.5 -2.0 -1.5 -1.2 -1.2 -2.2 -2.6 -5.7 -8.6 
Slovakia -12.3 -6.5 -8.2 -2.8 -2.4 -2.8 -3.2 -1.8 -2.1 -7.9 
Slovenia -3.7 -4.0 -2.5 -2.7 -2.2 -1.4 -1.3 0.0 -1.8 -5.8 
Spain -1.0 -0.6 -0.5 -0.2 -0.3 1.0 2.0 1.9 -4.2 -11.1 
Sweden 3.7 1.6 -1.2 -0.9 0.8 2.3 2.3 3.6 2.2 -0.9 
United Kingdom 3.6 0.5 -2.1 -3.4 -3.4 -3.4 -2.7 -2.7 -5.0 -11.4 
Source: Eurostat Statistics Database. Accessed 23 November 2010 
III 
Appendix 3: Real GDP change (in %) 
 
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
EU (27 countries) 3.9 2 1.2 1.3 2.5 2 3.2 3 0.5 -4.2 
Austria 3.7 0.5 1.6 0.8 2.5 2.5 3.6 3.7 2.2 -3.9 
Belgium 3.7 0.8 1.4 0.8 3.2 1.7 2.7 2.9 1 -2.8 
Bulgaria 5.7 4.2 4.7 5.5 6.7 6.4 6.5 6.4 6.2 -4.9 
Cyprus 5 4 2.1 1.9 4.2 3.9 4.1 5.1 3.6 -1.7 
Czech Republic 3.6 2.5 1.9 3.6 4.5 6.3 6.8 6.1 2.5 -4.1 
Denmark 3.5 0.7 0.5 0.4 2.3 2.4 3.4 1.6 -1.1 -5.2 
Estonia 10 7.5 7.9 7.6 7.2 9.4 10.6 6.9 -5.1 -13.9 
Finland 5.3 2.3 1.8 2 4.1 2.9 4.4 5.3 0.9 -8 
France 3.9 1.9 1 1.1 2.5 1.9 2.2 2.4 0.2 -2.6 
Germany 3.2 1.2 0 -0.2 1.2 0.8 3.4 2.7 1 -4.7 
Greece 4.5 4.2 3.4 5.9 4.4
p 
2.3
p 
4.5
p 
4.3
p 
1.3
p 
-2.3
p 
Hungary 4.9 3.8 4.1 4 4.5 3.2 3.6 0.8 0.8 -6.7 
Ireland 9.7 5.7 6.5 4.4 4.6 6 5.3 5.6 -3.5 -7.6 
Italy 3.7 1.8 0.5 0 1.5 0.7 2 1.5 -1.3 -5 
Latvia 6.9 8 6.5 7.2 8.7 10.6 12.2 10 -4.2 -18 
Lithuania 3.3 6.7 6.9 10.2 7.4 7.8 7.8 9.8 2.9 -14.7 
Luxembourg 8.4 2.5 4.1 1.5 4.4 5.4 5 6.6 1.4 -3.7 
Malta : -1.6 2.6 -0.3 0.9 4 3.6 3.7 2.6 -2.1 
Netherlands 3.9 1.9 0.1 0.3 2.2 2 3.4 3.9 1.9 -3.9 
Poland 4.3 1.2 1.4 3.9 5.3 3.6 6.2 6.8 5.1 1.7 
Portugal 3.9 2 0.7 -0.9 1.6 0.8 1.4 2.4 0 -2.6 
Romania 2.4 5.7 5.1 5.2 8.5 4.2 7.9 6.3 7.3 -7.1 
Slovakia 1.4 3.5 4.6 4.8 5.1 6.7 8.5 10.5 5.8 -4.8 
Slovenia 4.4 2.8 4 2.8 4.3 4.5 5.9 6.9 3.7 -8.1 
Spain 5 3.6 2.7 3.1 3.3 3.6 4 3.6 0.9 -3.7 
Sweden 4.5 1.3 2.5 2.3 4.2 3.2 4.3 3.3 -0.4 -5.1 
United Kingdom 3.9 2.5 2.1 2.8 3 2.2 2.8 2.7 -0.1 -5 
p = provisional value 
 
Source: Eurostat Statistics Database. Accessed 23 November 2010 
  
IV 
Appendix 4: The Chow’s test for regression stability 
 
We will use Baltagi (2008) in the appendix. We can consider two following regressions: 
           
           
   and    are observation matrices of dimensions      and     , respectively. Both 
   and    must be greater than  . Then the unrestricted regression is defined as: 
.
  
  
/  (
   
   
) (
  
  
)  .
  
  
/ 
The null hypothesis then states that all regression coefficients are equal for both 
equations: 
            
The restricted regression is defined as: 
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For the hypothesis testing we need to compute URSS and RRSS, residual sum of 
squares from unrestricted and restricted regression. There is also a possibility to use 
dummy variable approach used also in the thesis. Dummy variable (called split dummy 
in the thesis) denotes if the observation comes from the first or second observation 
matrix. The equation is then transformed into: 
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The test statistics of the Chow test is then: 
  
         
 
    
       
 
Under the null hypothesis the F statistics follows the F distribution with   and    
     degrees of freedom. 
  
V 
Appendix 5: Estimated parameter vector beta for Germany and Greece using no 
constraints on tau and with maturity range from 0 to 20 
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